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Abstract 
Nella tesi è analizzata nel dettaglio una proposta didattica sulla Fisica Quantistica elaborata 
dal gruppo di ricerca in Didattica della Fisica dell’Università di Bologna, in collaborazione 
con il gruppo di ricerca in Fisica Teorica e con ricercatori del CNR di Bologna. La proposta 
è stata sperimentata in diverse classi V di Liceo scientifico e dalle sperimentazioni sono 
emersi casi significativi di studenti che non sono riusciti ad accettare la teoria quantistica 
come descrizione convincente ad affidabile della realtà fisica (casi di non accettazione), 
nonostante sembrassero aver capito la maggior parte degli argomenti e essersi ‘appropriati’ 
del percorso per come gli era stato proposto. 
Questo dato empirico ha posto due questioni, affrontate in dettaglio nella tesi: (1) qual è la 
natura di questa non accettazione? Rispecchia una presa di posizione epistemologica o è 
espressione di una mancanza di comprensione profonda? (2) Nel secondo caso, è possibile 
individuare precisi meccanismi cognitivi che possono ostacolare o facilitare l’accettazione 
della fisica quantistica? 
L’analisi di interviste individuali degli studenti ha permesso di mettere in luce tre principali 
esigenze cognitive (cognitive needs) che sembrano essere coinvolte nell’accettazione e 
nell’apprendimento della fisica quantistica: le esigenze di visualizzabilità, comparabilità e 
di ‘realtà’.  
I ‘cognitive needs’ sono stati quindi utilizzati come strumenti di analisi delle diverse 
proposte didattiche in letteratura e del percorso di Bologna, al fine di metterne in luce le 
criticità. Sono state infine avanzate alcune proposte per un suo miglioramento.  
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Introduction 
 
From its advent, Quantum Physics has deeply revolutionized scientific thinking in its 
formal, methodological and philosophical dimensions. Today it represents the basis upon 
which most of the modern theoretical frameworks are developed, and has been proved in its 
implications with the greatest accuracy ever. However, despite its fruitful successes, 
quantum physics still challenges scientists’ conceptions about physics foundations and 
arouses a fascinating debate upon the meaning of some of its fundamentals. 
With the Italian reform of secondary schools introduced by the Education Minister 
Mariastella Gelmini in 2010-2011, contents of quantum physics have become part of the 
official curriculum of all the “scientific Licei”, because of their cultural significance and 
their essential role in the comprehension of recent technological developments and 
applications. 
This dissertation is situated precisely in the context of the scientific research on teaching 
quantum physics in secondary schools and, in particular, it aims at contributing for the 
improvement of the teaching proposal developed by the research group in Physics 
Education at the University of Bologna, in collaboration with the research group in 
Theoretical Physics of the CNR of Bologna. The author of this Dissertation has followed 
the last stage of the development of the path, its implementations in three classes of 
scientific Liceo and taught in a further experimentation in a scientific high school in Castel 
san Pietro. 
The main goal of this thesis is to build analytic tools to interpret one of the main evidences 
that emerged from the quantum path’s implementations: the presence of significant cases of 
students who did not accept quantum physics as an adequate and personally reliable 
explanation of reality. The cases of non-acceptance, as we called them, concern also 
students who appeared to be confident with the formalism and also to have appropriated the 
path as it was proposed. Indeed, non-acceptance of quantum physics is not a new issue, 
both in the historical development of the theory and in didactical physics’ research; 
however, it has never been specifically addressed in detail. The dissertation provides a 
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rather detailed analysis of students’ acceptance dynamics and, on the basis of the achieved 
results, it points out critical points to be strengthened for improving the teaching proposal. 
The dissertation is articulated in four chapters, followed by some concluding remarks. 
In chapter 1, after a brief sketch of the ministerial guidelines, an overview on the state of art 
about the different approaches for teaching quantum physics is presented. In this context, it 
is also collocated the proposal Bologna’s group; its main didactical choices and its 
conceptual structure are pointed out, as well as the school contexts in which it was 
implemented. 
In chapter 2 some cases of clear non-acceptance are reported and, after being contextualised 
in the research framework where they occurred, they are deeply analysed. From a 
methodological point of view, a hermeneutic qualitative approach has been chosen, and 
some specific cognitive requirements, which we called cognitive needs, were found and 
used to interpret students’ resistance in accepting quantum physics. A comparative analysis 
allowed us to conjecture that they could be grouped in three different categories: the need 
of visualisation, comparability, and reality, in the specific nuances described in the chapter.  
In Chapter 3 some critical points of the teaching proposal are presented, namely the 
uncertainty principle and the superposition state. The cognitive needs were used as 
analytical tools for interpreting students’ reactions and, by triangulating the findings with 
literature, some specific suggestions for improving the path were developed. In particular, 
the issue of the ontological shift from classical to quantum physics has been recognised as a 
crucial cognitive mechanism that can foster or hinder the process of accepting quantum 
physics. 
In Chapter 4 some proposals for improving the teaching path and satisfying the cognitive 
requirements are developed along the lines of what we found in chapters 2 and 3.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Teaching quantum physics in upper  
secondary schools 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Italians’ ministerial instructions for Scientific Licei 
A new Physics syllabus for the scientific Licei was introduced by the Education Minister 
Mariastella Gelimini in the year 2010-11, with the aim of updating scholastic curricula and 
making them closer and more relevant to present-day issues. The purpose of secondary 
education in Italian Licei is to: 
 
“Provide students with the cultural and methodological tools needed to achieve a 
thorough understanding of reality; to follow the development of scientific and 
technological research; to identify interconnections between different forms of 
knowledge [...]”  
(Article 2, sub-section 2, “Revisione dell'assetto ordinamentale, organizzativo e 
didattico dei Licei”, 2008) 
 
The choice is to emphasize the knowledge developed in the 20th century. As far as  the 
teaching of Physics in Scientific Licei and Scientific Licei – Option of Applied Science is 
concerned, the curriculum includes basic concepts of Quantum Physics (QP), since they are 
considered essential for the comprehension of recent technological developments and 
applications: 
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“The establishment of the light quantum model can be introduced through the study of 
the thermal radiation and of Planck's hypothesis (perhaps adopting a merely 
qualitative approach). This model will be developed, on one hand, through the study 
of the photoelectric effect and its interpretation by Einstein and, on the other hand, by 
discussing theories and experimental results highlighting the presence of discreet 
energy levels in the atom. This conceptual itinerary can be concluded by mentioning 
the experimental evidence for the wave nature of matter, as postulated by de Broglie, 
as well as the uncertainty principle. Further emphasis on the experimental dimension 
of physics can be achieved through activities to be carried out in the school's didactic 
lab, in academic and research institutes, in connection with orientation projects for 
higher education” (National Guidelines for Licei, Ministerial Decree n. 211, October 
7th, 2010). 
 
The National Guidelines outline a typical qualitative and pseudo-historical approach 
focused almost exclusively on the “old quantum theory”. This approach is the most 
traditional one and can be found in most textbooks (see for instance (Amaldi, 2015) and 
(Halliday, Resnik & Walker, 2001)).  
Some research on teaching QP has revealed that it is experienced by students and teachers 
as a sort of ‘patchwork’ of conceptually disconnected information, often kept together only 
by the chronological presentation of discoveries. One problematic consequence of this 
conceptual fragmentation is that students, in the attempt for filling the gaps between these 
‘chunks’ of information, end up associating classical properties to quantum systems. This 
leads also to disappointing results, which often reveal a deep skepticism towards QP 
(Tarozzi, 2005). 
Despite its numerous drawbacks, the historical approach can be useful – with the necessary 
precautions –to reflect on the epistemic nature of the subject and on its methodological 
laws, which may not be explicitly examined in other approaches. Furthermore, the 
ministerial guidelines leave room for teachers to introduce insights into specific topics 
pertaining to QP or to choose different approaches.  
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1.1.2 State of the art 
As alternatives to the historical perspective, other paths have been designed based on a 
logico-philosophical and/or a phenomenological approach. In this section these approaches 
are briefly outlined so as to better contextualize the educational choices that led the group 
of Bologna to design their own path. Further elements of analysis of the approaches are 
provided in chapter 3. 
 
! Logico-philosophical approach 
The logico-philosophical approach originates from the present-day structure of quantum 
theory, namely from its ‘axiomatic’ structure (Haber-Schaim, 1975; Lawrence, 1996). 
Although the mathematical formalism cannot be fully developed at a secondary-school 
level, as Pospiech claims, QP main ideas can be understood by focusing on the concept of 
spin, which does not have any classical counterpart, and Pauli’s matrices, as it is 
“impossible to understand QP without mastering its mathematical structures” (Pospiesch, 
1999). By introducing the concept of spin from scratch, it is possible to move to the 
superposition principle and other elements of QP axiomatic structure, without making use 
of semi-classical representations which students risk sticking to.  
The application of the formalism to various experimental configurations (such as Stern-
Gerlach experiments) is aimed to help students to understand the connection between the 
theoretical and experimental dimensions, so that they can envision a less abstract image of 
QP. In her works, Pospiech demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach in highlighting 
the fundamental aspects of QP related to topics as the principles of superposition and 
indeterminacy, complementarity, entanglement, indistinguishability and measurement 
process (Pospiech, 2010), and also points out the feasibility of teaching this kind of 
formalism in secondary schools. 
 
! Phenomenological approach 
This latter approach presents the concepts of QP through a phenomenological analysis of 
experimental results, in order to build up the theoretical framework on the logical base of 
what is observed from the experiments themselves. 
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An exemplification of this approach is the one based on Ghirardi’s introduction to QP 
(Ghirardi, 1997), whose argumentation is based upon experiments about the polarization of 
light carried out with Polaroid filters and bi-refringent crystals. The experimental outcomes 
guide the construction of hypothetical interpretative models, explicating each one’s inner 
logic, up until introducing the superposition principle as the only reasonable logic 
expression for accounting them. Such an approach has been put into didactical practice by 
the research group in Udine (Michelini, Ragazzoni, Santi, & Stefanel, 2000; Stefanel, 
2007). The results of the Udine’s group experiments, reported in Stefanel (2007), indicate 
that – on a conceptual level – most students were able to understand the difference between 
quantum state and classical state, even if the consequences of the existence of non-
compatible observables were not always clear. One further difficulty, linked to 
indeterminacy, is the fall of classical determinism. As far as formalism is concerned, 
Stefanel claims it to not hinder students’ learning processes, but rather to help them. 
A second, interesting, implementation of the phenomenological approach was proposed by 
the research group in Physics Education at the University of Pavia (Malgieri, 2015). The 
teaching proposal is based on Feynman’s paths method, and it benefits from the support of 
interactive simulations created with the open-source software GeoGebra. These simulations 
provide activities of exploration and inquiry that would otherwise be carried out with 
difficulty in a laboratory. Beside its constructive part being based on Feynman reflections, 
it is chosen to follow a phenomenological process through different experiments for 
construction of photon model. Among these experiments are: classical experiments of light 
diffraction and interference; Young’s experiment with single photons, electrons, neutrons 
and C60 molecules; Grangier experiment; Mach-Zehnder and Zhou-Wand-Mandel 
experiments; experiments with confined quantum particles. The proposal has been 
implemented in contexts of teacher education and in a class of secondary students 
(Malgieri, 2015). The results of this latter experimentation will be further considered in the 
analyses reported in chapters 2 and 3.  
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1.2  BOLOGNA’S GROUP TEACHING PROPOSAL 
1.2.1 Main didactical choices 
The Bologna’s research group works within the context of the aforementioned 
experimentations of didactical paths for teaching QP, and has developed different proposals 
throughout the years.  
The first path was described in (Tarozzi, 2005) and (Levrini & Fantini, 2013) and it was 
designed to create a rich and complex learning environment, in which students could 
navigate through different personal trajectories; it was divided in two parts, each 
characterized by a different approach (historical-philosophical in the first one, 
phenomenological and formal in the second). The leading thread was the concept of 
‘object’ from the ‘Old Quantum Physics’ to its systematisation through the interpretation of 
Stern-Gerlach experiments with the Dirac notation for states and Pauli’s matrices. The 
results of this experimentation show that students’ difficulties had been turned into cultural 
challenges, producing a widespread involvement despite their personal attitude towards 
physics. The learning path, in fact, was built according to some guiding criteria, chosen to 
problematize knowledge and to foster its cultural value, according to an idea of science in 
which many points of view are legitimate and possible. The guiding criteria were: 
! Multi-perspectiveness: the same physical contents (phenomenologies) are analyzed 
from different perspectives so as to encourage multiple connections among the content 
and conceptual routes; 
! Multi-dimensionality: the different perspectives and multiple connections are analyzed 
and compared also for their philosophical-epistemological peculiarities, as well as for 
their relations with experiments and formalism; 
! Longitudinality: the ‘‘game’’ of modelling quantum phenomena is systematically 
analysed and compared with the models already encountered by the students during the 
study of other physics topics (classical mechanics, special relativity and 
thermodynamics) (Levrini & Fantini, 2013), 
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A second proposal was built by a group of researchers of the Physics and Astronomy 
Department, in collaboration with the CNR-IMM in Bologna to be implemented in a lab for 
volunteer secondary students. The lab was part of the activities of the ‘Piano Lauree 
Scientifiche’ (PLS) and aimed to provide students the chance to understand the essential 
elements of quantum perspective, starting from the ‘The most beautiful experiment in 
Physics’ (MBE), that is the double slit experiment with single electrons, firstly realized in 
Bologna in 1974 (http://l-esperimento-piu-bello-dellafisica.bo.imm.cnr.it/) (Lulli, 2013), 
(Levrini, Lulli, Bertozzi, Ercolessi, Matteucci, Monzoni & Pecori, 2014; Stefanini, 2013). 
The main feature of the path was its multidimensionality, being the epistemological, 
formal, logical, experimental and applicative aspects of QP discussed and critically 
analysed.  
The experimentation was analysed by Lucia Stefanini who, in her dissertation (2013), 
wrote: 
 
“Students were able to accept the mathematics featured in the course, and they did 
not perceive it as being out of their league. Mathematical formalism was also 
regarded as a useful tool for interpreting and understanding the experiments that 
were carried out.  
Questionnaires were handed out to students, aimed at obtaining feedback on several 
aspects of the course. Results brought to light a great variety of interests, and this is 
proof that the course’s multi-dimensionality was effective in stimulating curiosity and 
to encourage multiple approaches to scientific knowledge. Students have also 
grasped the language of formalism in the context of quantum applications, often 
using it when re-elaborating what they had learnt. 
This project has therefore obtained very positive feedback from both students and 
teachers, as well as showing great potential for possible use as a learning path in 
fifth-year scientific classes” (Stefanini, 2013) 
 
The two previous paths converged into a third one that was designed to be implemented in 
real classes of scientific Liceo. This third path is the one analysed also for the purposes of 
	   17	  
the present dissertation. A detailed description is reported in Lodovico (2016). In the next 
sections we simply sketch its macro structure and the contexts where it was implemented. 
The most delicate parts of the proposal (uncertainty principle and the introduction of the 
quantum interpretative apparatus) are described in some details in chapter 3, where we try 
to localize some specific difficulties met by the students. 
 
1.2.2  Design of Bologna’s teaching proposal 
The proposal was designed by a working group of people who involved researchers in 
physics education, 4 physics and math teachers, post-doc students and undergraduate 
students (among which the author of this dissertation). The group met every three weeks 
from December 2014 to May 2015 in order to analyse the previous paths and adapt them to 
the new school contexts. The challenge was to account both for the National Indications 
and for the results in physics education.  
The core idea developed by the group was to join up a destructive part belonging to the ‘old 
quantum physics’ (the pars destruens) with a constructive framework (pars construens) by 
using the MBE as an epistemological, experimental and conceptual junction. As suggested 
by Feynman, in fact, this experiment touches the very core of quantum physics, leading to 
face directly with some contradictions and interpretative limits of classical paradigms.  
The pars destruens revolves around the four fundamental phenomena related to the “old 
quantum theory” and foreseen in the National Indications: black body, photoelectric effect, 
Compton effect and Bohr’s atomic model. Even if the choice of dealing with these issues 
was somehow obliged by ministerial guidelines, the attempt was to strongly bet on this 
part, in order to foster the discrete-continuous debate. The latter was chosen as leading 
thread to connect in a sensible way the various phenomena and situate them into a 
“significance framework”.  
The junction part has the role of leading students towards the pars construens by presenting 
the first steps that led to the search for a new comprehensive theoretical framework that 
could account for all those phenomena that challenged and put in crisis the classical 
paradigms. The topics treated are the uncertainty relations, complementarity and the MBE, 
in the ways that we deeply describe in chapter 3 and in chapter 4. A special role was played 
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by the contribution of Giorgio Lulli, senior researcher at IMM-CNR, and by his line for 
presenting the experimental and interpretative challenges opened with the MBE (Lulli, 
2013). 
As far as pars construens is concerned, the group chose to follow the path developed for 
the PLS context by Elisa Ercolessi and Vittorio Monzoni. It focused on Stern-Gerlach 
experiments, so as to build a constructive framework not linked to classical-like properties 
and to avoid any semi-classical misconception. According to Pospiech, the researchers 
decided to focus the construction of the genuine interpretative apparatus on something 
completely new, as the spin of Ag atom.  
 
1.3 Experimentations and research questions 
The latter teaching proposal has been implemented in four different schools within the 
2014-2015 scholastic year:  
- a class of the “A. Einstein” Liceo in Rimini (teacher: Paola Fantini) 
- a class of the “A. Righi” Liceo in Bagno di Romagna (teacher: Laura Branchetti) 
- a class of the “Archimede” Liceo in San Giovanni in Persiceto (teacher: Elisa 
Garagnani) 
- a class of the “Malpighi Visitandine” high school in Castel san Pietro (teacher: 
Giovanni Ravaioli, author of the present dissertation) 
 
The teachers were part of the working group who designed the materials of the learning 
path. A conference of Giorgio Lulli on the MBE was organised for all the classes just as 
introduction to the pars construens. 
A broad and detailed analysis of the experimentation held in Rimini by Paola Fantini was 
carried out by Luca Lodovico and is reported in his master degree dissertation (Lodovico, 
2016). The aim of the analysis was to build a comprehensive picture of what happened in 
class and to check the effectiveness of the learning path to foster processes of 
appropriation, as it is meant by Levrini and co-workers (2015). What was pointed out is an 
acceptable conceptual understanding and a general good level for students’ involvement 
with the proposed path. Some issues in the classroom dynamics was pointed out as a 
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possible factor hindering appropriation. Nevertheless, what is mainly important here, was 
the discovery of cases of non-acceptance of QP, namely students who couldn’t accept the 
theory as a reliable description of physical reality, and a more detailed study on this issue 
was claimed for. Since this type of cases was pointed out also in the implementation of 
Pavia proposal, we elevated this phenomenon to ‘evidence’, worth to be investigated. 
This it the very goal of the present dissertation. More specifically, it aims at addressing to 
the following research questions: 
RQ1: How can the occurring of cases of non-acceptance be interpreted? What is 
their very nature? Do they simply mirror an epistemological stance, or do 
they reveal a cognitive lack in the understanding process? 
RQ2: Is there a particular hidden cognitive mechanism preventing or fostering 
acceptance of quantum physics? If so, can it be pointed out? 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 aim to answer respectively these two questions. The answers will orient 
the revision and improvement of the teaching proposal, as we describe in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 2  
The ‘acceptance’ problem in quantum physics 
education 
 
 
2.1 FOCUSING ON ‘ACCEPTANCE’  
While analysing some student’s interviews and discussions, we clashed into an important 
aspect that appeared to be a common problematic issue in most of experimentations about 
quantum physics (QP) education: the issue of acceptance, as we refer to it here. Generally 
speaking, we noticed that a significant number of students found it difficult to accept the 
theory as a personally reliable and adequate description of reality and of the accounted 
phenomenology. 
The cases of students who did not accept QP, namely cases of non-acceptance, occurred 
even though they seemed to have understood and also appropriated the theory as it was 
proposed. The acceptance issue strongly characterizes the history of QP, but we are prone 
to think that it assumes a special meaning in QP’s education, where it gets in relation with 
students’ learning and appropriation processes. We indeed conjectured that it refers also to 
a cognitive dimension and not only to an epistemological or philosophical one. As will be 
shown throughout our analysis, the acceptance issue has already emerged in different 
studies about teaching QP; nevertheless, it has never been addressed in detail as a specific 
research problem in physics education research.  
The aim of this chapter is to show the effective reality of the problem of acceptance and to 
shape it through the analysis of some selected interviews. This study follows up the work 
reported in the article of Levrini and Fantini (2013) that is a post-analysis of an 
experimentation based on the teaching proposal (2012 version) of Bologna’s research 
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group, conducted in two secondary-school classes. In that study all the students describe the 
formalism as intelligible and a necessary requirement, but for some of them it seems to be 
insufficient to completely comprehend the theory, or to accept it. As said by a student: “The 
problem was not understanding but accepting the consequences of the theory”.  Already 
there, it was clear that understanding the basic ideas and the formalism’s rules is not 
enough to have the feeling of “getting it”. A deeper and more sophisticated elaboration is 
needed to re-conceptualise – and accept - the strong detachment from classical conceptual 
categories, which are of course deeply rooted in students’ ways of thinking about physical 
reality. As will be shown, the whole analysis points out personal and specific commitments 
that some students are not easily disposed to renounce in order to accept QP as a reliable 
explanation of reality. The strength of these requirements, which we will call cognitive 
needs, is strictly related to each one’s inclinations, personality and cultural background. 
From a methodological point of view, a hermeneutic qualitative approach has been chosen. 
It is focused on a selection of cases to analyse in depth so as to capture the very origin of 
the phenomenon we observed (the difficulty of accepting QP).  
In order to make the analysis reliable, and to grasp problems that could be as much as 
possible context-independent, we considered materials from different teaching experiments. 
In particular, we refer here to the experimentations conducted by the research group of the 
University of Bologna in 2012 and in 2015 in Rimini (yet partially analysed in Levrini and 
Fantini (2013), Stefanini (2014) and Lodovico (2016)), in 2015 in Bagno di Romagna and 
in 2016 in Castel san Pietro (not yet analysed); some results are also cited from the 
experimentations conducted by the research group in physics education of University of 
Pavia in 2014 and 2015 (Malgieri, 2015).  
The analysis started by focusing on three cases of evident non-acceptation that came out in 
three different contexts. Students’ profiles were built so as to report their personal ways to 
describe their perplexities on QP. The profiles allowed to recognise, in particular, the words 
used by the students and the topics they found to be particularly puzzling. Thanks to the 
construction of the profiles, we could recognise the semantic fields to which students’ 
words belonged and, hence, to formulate an hypothesis about the cognitive dimension and 
its articulation behind non-acceptance. This hypothesis has been hence developed. 
This whole process is reported in this chapter according to the following outline. 
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This section (2.1) is completed with an analysis of the research literature, aimed to position 
the acceptance issue. 
Section (2.2) reports the three emblematic cases of clear non-acceptance, two from 
Bologna’s results and one from Pavia’s, the analysis of which allowed us to point out the 
involvement of the cognitive needs in acceptance dynamics.  
In section (2.3) a detailed description of the cognitive needs is developed, grouped in three 
main categories: need of visualisation, need of comparability, and need of reality.  
The whole analysis led us to point out the critical points of the teaching proposal, besides 
giving also the criteria to zooming in and interpret them. This will be the aim of chapters 3 
and 4. 
As to not get lost with the names and the experimentations of the students analysed in the 
next sections, we report them here in table below, divided in cases of non-acceptance and 
acceptance, as will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
Cases of non-acceptance 
Marco Rimini 
Federico Rimini 
Alice Castel san Pietro 
Cases of acceptance 
Andrea Bagno di Romagna 
Anna Rimini 
Cheng Pavia 
Silvia Rimini1 
Jessica Rimini1 
Simone Rimini1 
Luigi Rimini1 
Michele Rimini1 
Table 2.1:  names and corresponding experimentations of the students analysed 
in this chapter
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2.1.1 How did we get at this stage? Re-analysis of literature 
Before investigating acceptance’s dynamics in students’ interviews, we contextualize the 
non-acceptance issue, as it emerged in classrooms, in the whole international panorama. 
Here we briefly recall and re-analyse the main phases of the research in QP education, until 
mentioning the most innovative learning paths where non-acceptance occurred. 
The development of international research in QP education, both at a university and pre-
university level, went through a lot of drastic route’s changes, but also through many 
enrichments. The long process that brought to the actual situation highlights three main 
typologies of problems, which have had to be faced off over the past 30 years:  
 
! the diagnosis of the main conceptual difficulties which occurred in students dealing 
with QP; 
! the design of new learning paths which could be incisive for gathering the essence 
of quantum theory; 
! the problem of moving through the strenuous debate upon the foundations of QP 
and of deciding which interpretative approach had to be chosen. 
 
 
Criticalities of historical-like approaches 
A first phase of research was characterized by the analysis of students’ conceptions in order 
to investigate the real effectiveness of the commonly used teaching approaches, that is the 
approaches that mainly focused on those transition phenomena which belong to the so-
called 'Old Quantum Physics'. Until about two decades ago, all over the world, most of the 
university and secondary school textbooks appeared to follow an historical approach to 
guide students to enter QP. This approach started with the discussion of the black-body 
radiation, the photoelectric effect, the Compton effect and Bohr’s atom, as well as 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty and Bohr’s complementarity principles.  
Plenty of surveys allowed students’ misconceptions to be brought out. A rich and 
interesting review is reported in Malgieri (2015). For our purposes, the main result 
concerns the teaching of QP at a secondary school level and, in particular, the implications 
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of paths that deal only with the old QP. It is well-known that these approaches have the 
weakness of providing sets of disconnected information. The most problematic 
consequence of this conceptual fragmentation is that students tend to fill the gaps by 
associating classical properties to quantum systems, reaching a sort of scepticism towards 
quantum theory itself (as introduced in chapter 1 for the results reported by Tarozzi 
(2005)). The main critique towards these historical-like paths can be synthesized in the 
lack, next to a demolition process of the Physics of late ‘800, of a constructive apparatus 
based on quantum formalism and its interpretative categories (Levrini et al., 2015b). 
 
Building up formal constructive frameworks 
Over the years, and especially since the late 90’s, the studies on the foundations and 
education of QP moved to the development of courses and materials aimed to introduce, 
also at the secondary school level, genuine quantum concepts within logical and consistent 
formal frameworks. As a reaction, the main trend in physics education was to design 
approaches, also for secondary schools, that aimed to completely detach teaching from the 
historical evolution of quantum theory. As introduced in Chapter 1, different proposals and 
approaches have been produced along this research line. The logical-philosophical 
approach (Lawrence, 1996) (Pospiech, 1999) is, for example, based upon the axiomatic 
structure of QP and starts from the introduction of spin and Pauli’s matrices in order to lead 
the students closer and closer to the mathematical structures of QP. Other proposals follow 
a phenomenological approach, namely using key experiments to derive quantum 
description of the world; examples are the proposals based on the phenomenological 
analysis of light polarization or of phenomena of double refraction through calcite crystals 
(Ghirardi, 1997; Stefanel, 2008); other examples are the proposals based on the 
experiments of diffraction and double slit interference reanalysed through Feynman’s 
approach of the sum over paths (Feynman, 1985; Taylor et al, 1998; Rinaudo, 2010).   
All these efforts generally brought to a real and remarkable enhancement in students’ 
comprehension of quantum foundations, in the sense that students appear to make strong 
progresses in solving problems and exercises concerning genuine and deep quantum 
concepts (Michelini et al., 2010). 
 
	  
	  
	  
26	  
Interpretation matters 
It is in this cultural and didactical context that Baily and Finkelstein carried out one of the 
most interesting and original studies on QP’s teaching (Baily & Finkelstein, 2010). They 
focused their attention on the effective relevance of teachers’ choices to foster a proper 
detachment from classical categories, and in particular those choices concerning issues of 
interpretative nature. With interpretative the authors mean those issues that concern the 
philosophical stances in interpreting QP’s formalism. 
The study regards a statistical survey conducted in two university classes, dealing with 
courses on QP. The courses’ structure was quite the same, but the respective teachers chose 
two different positions about dealing with interpretative issues: one opted for an ‘agnostic’ 
position, strongly and explicitly characterised by avoiding any kind of interpretative 
nuance; the other one chose to deal explicitly with them, often taking a ‘realist’ stance on 
the electron description (for example explicitly assuming that in the double slit interference 
experiment the electron passes through only slit, being it a tiny particle). 
For addressing student responses the authors individuated three main possible positions: 
realist (the electron is a tiny particle, the probability density is so widespread for our 
ignorance), quantum (the electron interferes with itself, being describe by a probability 
wave), and agnostic (QP is only about predicting the outcomes of experiments.). The 
results (fig. 2.1) show that those students who dealt with the ‘agnostic’ teacher (PHYS3B in 
figure) tended to maintain more easily a ‘realist’ and still purely classical visualisation of 
the phenomenon and of the electron itself. 
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Figure 2.1: plot form (Baily & Finkelstein, 2010). An agnostic stance in teaching QP 
(PHYS3B) can produce a still classical way of thinking about quantum phenomena 
 
Thus, ironically, despite what kind of philosophical stance is chosen, without any 
interpretative introduction to quantum phenomena and to its formalism, still stands the risk 
of getting back to a naïve realism, related to those misconceptions that were to be avoided 
with the introduction of a constructive quantum framework. 
This study opens the very delicate point about what interpretative perspective can be 
chosen in teaching and why. If, on one hand, it is unrealistic and educationally idle to re-
present the complicate debate that historically occurred for interpreting QP, what 
interpretative aspects are needed to recognise the new paradigm of QP and to overcome 
classical views? Of course, the study reported in this dissertation cannot answer this 
enormous question, but it is positioned exactly there: it aims to provide a contribution to 
analyse the interpretative issue from a cognitive perspective. The problem is particularly 
relevant because most of the teachers struggle with the interpretative issues as, despite 
being the main teaching trend for avoiding any interpretation, they feel uncomfortable in 
front of such a broad variety of stances.  
In this perspective, a study conducted in 2013 by M. Shlosshauer and colleagues 
(Shlosshauer, Kwiat & Zeilinger, 2013) aimed at investigating the views of 33 participants 
(27 of which physicists, 5 philosophers and 3 mathematicians) of an international 
conference on QP (“Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality”, July 2011, International 
Academy Traunkirchen, Austria). The survey concerned critical topics, like randomness of 
individual events, measurement process, Bell’s inequalities, quantum information, quantum 
computers, interpretations of the state and of quantum physics in general.  
The results show a widespread spectrum of position on most of the questions, and in 
particular it’s interesting what found for some specific issues, which we report below: 
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Figure 2.2: results from Shlosshauer and co-workers (Shlosshauer, Kwiat & Zeilinger, 2013) 
 
In this context it is not surprising that a consistent part of teachers chooses to keep a forced 
agnostic stance, as there isn’t an unanimously shared interpretation which might better fit 
with teaching/learning goals. However the cited article from Baily & Finkelstein (2010) 
reveals a new common feeling that a meta-reflection on the conceptual changes that 
quantum theory imposes is crucial to enter QP as a reliable way of conceiving and 
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understanding phenomena.  
This is maybe the reason why very recent proposals for teaching QP at the secondary 
school level, although still based on those fundamental constructive frameworks developed 
up until late ’90, arrive to deal, more or less explicitly, with interpretation issues. It is in the 
implementation of these approaches including an interpretative dimension that the 
acceptance issue emerges as the most relevant result. 
We will present and discuss the proposals in the next chapter, after that we have unpacked 
the acceptance issue as it is complained by the students. This will allow us to present the 
proposals by focusing on the critical interpretative details that can foster or hinder 
acceptance.  
 
The problem of non-acceptance 
To sum up, the research in QP education produced important results to reveal the 
misconceptions induced by historical-like paths and, hence, fostered the design of paths that 
were focused, in a first moment, on the problem of how to build constructive genuine 
frameworks and, in a second moment, on how to introduce also epistemological and 
interpretative issues. 
Despite encouraging successes, this is the very state of the art in which our own results 
upon non-acceptance arise. As explained, even though most of the students seem to have 
learnt the physics contents in its formal, experimental and epistemological dimensions, they 
complain that the quantum theory is not a reliable and adequate description of reality. In the 
following analysis of students’ excerpts we try to better understand these positions so as to 
understand if they are related to a specific epistemological view or if they are the 
expression of a surface and merely technical understanding. 
In the history of physics relevant physicists did not accept QP according to their legitimate 
‘realist’ stance. Thus, our analysis aims to unpack if students’ non-acceptance can be 
considered a philosophical option eventually embraceable or if it is related to a sort of 
‘naïve realism’ due to the lack of awareness or to cognitive difficulties to grasp the new 
paradigm. 
This latter possibility is a very interesting challenge for research since it points out that a 
generic insistence on interpretative issues, which is necessary and already in use in most of 
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proposals, is not enough to remove the pillars of this classical-like attitude towards QP. A 
more reasoned and precise interpretative approach has to be developed. 
 
2.2 CASES OF NON-ACCEPTANCE 
In this paragraph three cases of clear non-acceptance of QP are brought out, two of which 
from Bologna’s experimentations and one from Pavia’s. In order to investigate acceptance 
dynamics, we focused on those students who generally well understood the formalism, and 
also have a fairly high degree of appropriation; this provide a focalisation on the personal 
aspects which overcome in learning process, leaving aside those cases in which non-
acceptance is due to a lack of preparation. The first two cases presented (Marco and Cheng) 
show an explicit refusal of quantum description of reality, and still claim for a more 
‘realistic’ theory to be found in future. In the third case (Alice), non-acceptance is not 
explicitly expressed in the requirement of a new theoretical framework, but it emerges as a 
difficulty in feeling confident with the description proposed.  
 
2.2.1 Marco: postulating ‘well-defined properties’ 
Marco2 (experimentation led in Rimini, 2015) is a student whose idiosyncratic idea of 
science is mainly founded in its utility and its possible applications: “science has to be used 
in technical field […] to create, let’s say, the great inventions”. Marco is considered by his 
classmates as a good and hardworking student, and the analysis reported in Lodovico 
(2016) shows that he appears to have generally appropriated the basic ideas of QP. 
Nevertheless, he consistently insists that he cannot accept it as a complete explanation of 
reality, and in particular as reliable description of quantum objects. For example when 
asked about the superposition principle (in the context of Stern-Gerlach experiments), he 
answers as follows: 
 
Marco:  If I hypothetically can take a measure with a sufficiently sophisticated 
instrument, that object would have [would reveal] a well-defined property. The 
object itself does own a well-defined property, that’s what I believe. […] As 
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Einstein, mine postulate is that an object has to embody well-defined 
properties. 
[E-1] 
Or, for what concerns the uncertainty principle: 
 
Interviewer: […] What was the most useful way for you to comprehend the meaning of 
quantum uncertainty in its revolutionary holding? 
Marco: So… if I have to be honest, none. 
Interviewer: None of these [he had listed them before]? 
Marco: All of these partly contributed, but none gave me a thorough explanation. 
Namely, what I was searching for as an explanation, I haven’t found it in any 
of these.  
Marco:  […] [I was in] a great confusion, not mostly because of the mathematic part, 
[in fact] I could understand the concepts the teacher was talking about, […] 
they were logically comprehensible. The point is that I couldn’t understand 
how couldn’t a body have its own properties, well-defined properties… 
[E-2] 
The two quotations above show that his need of classical-like properties plays for him the 
role of a real postulate, which can’t be put aside. The strength of this requirement probably 
comes from his very personality and from his idiosyncratic idea of science, but in its nature 
it seems to be strictly founded on the categories of classical physics, which we are prone to 
say he has not yet overcome. This generally produces in Marco a form of scepticism 
towards QP, that affects his acceptance of the uncertainty relation and superposition 
principle, but also of the concept of ‘quanton’ and probability, as he states:  
 
Marco:  To me the word ‘probability’ is quite an ‘escamotage’ [trick] that we use to…to 
determine the phenomenon with certainty […] But, indeed, these are the errors 
induced by this way of representing this fundamental issue, namely the one of non-
defined properties.  
[E-3] 
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Indeed, Marco’s search for applications and technological developments serves him to 
partially postpone the problem of accepting QP in its implications. But in postponing the 
problem he always specifies his concern, for example, on uncertainty relation: 
 
Marco: …although I don’t agree with it, I understood that Heisenberg’s hypothesis [of 
uncertainty] in necessary in this moment. […] I notice that considering the 
quanton as non-defined particle, even though I don’t agree, is in any event fruitful 
for the moment. Just like as your mother tries to convince you that black dogs are 
evil, and you know they’re not […], but she gives you 50 euros every time you say: 
“yes, ok, ok”. 
[E-4] 
Hence, although Marco’s idiosyncratic idea of science reveals a sort of empiricism, and the 
very reason that leads him to not accept QP is founded on epistemological requirements and 
considerations; he feels the necessity to “find a more epistemologically accurate meaning”. 
 
2.2.2 Cheng: “I would like to know more about reality” 
Cheng is a Chinese student form the experimentation of the group of Pavia. His case is 
extensively investigated in Malgieri (2015). He seems to have well understood all the 
disciplinary contents of the course and, on the basis of the markers proposed in Levrini and 
colleagues (2015a), he seems to have also quite appropriated the theory and the proposed 
learning path, with the exception of its discourse to be carrier of social relationships (as 
reported in Malgieri’s analysis, Cheng did not actively participate to any discussion 
conducted in classroom, maybe also because of his difficulties with the language). 
As it appear in Malgieri’s PhD Dissertation, Cheng correctly talks about the main historical 
developments of QP, describes the wave-particle duality from the point of view of some 
different scientists, and also explains in detail the most recent developments proposed in 
classroom (entanglement among the others). But, despite his confidence with all these 
issues, when interviewed he explicitly states that he cannot accept quantum theory as a 
‘final’ explanation: 
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Interviewer:  So you are not convinced by the idea of a quantum objects, which is neither 
wave nor particle (...) You believe a better explanation exists. 
Cheng:  I think it exists, but hasn't been found yet. 
[…] 
Cheng:  I would like to discover why it is that way. 
Interviewer:  Is it my impression or there is something that you do not accept. 
Cheng:  Exactly. I would like to know more about reality. 
Interviewer:  So you don't accept it. Sooner or later it will be discovered. 
Cheng:  Yes. Exactly. 
[E-5] 
Cheng doesn’t face any repulsion towards mathematics; on the contrary, he firmly believes 
in the explicating power of formalism: “Images can help you understand, while the 
mathematical model simplifies everything. If we know how it works, it makes us remember 
everything at a glance".  
This confidence with mathematics leads him to consider QP understandable, as he 
demonstrates when speaking about ‘Which Way’ measurements: “It is surprising because it 
does not follow the classical probability rule, but it’s not incomprehensible, because it 
follows the quantum probability rule. So it is surprising, but only because it is computed in 
a different way”. He shows also to have a precise idea of the relationship between physics 
and mathematics, as a description of intrinsic laws of Nature (which he demand to be the 
classical physics’ ones): 
 
Interviewer:  So you believe Newton's formula for gravitation exists somewhere, and we just 
discover it.  
Cheng: It exists, in the sense that it's intrinsic. But it's not mathematics. We 
mathematize it.  
[E-6] 
Hence, Cheng declares to understand QP and to be able to visualize, for example, 
Feynman’s model; furthermore he seems peaceful to momentarily accept QP for its results 
in calculations. But at the same time, confronting his idea with those of the most important 
scientists who developed QP, he is sure that this is not the final answer, as he explains:  
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Cheng:  I believe objects to have a definite position and momentum. There is something 
that escapes our understanding. But it is not that uncertainty is due to 
measurement. It due to some other reason. Something which we still don't 
know. 
[E-7] 
As it was for Marco, this need of more ‘realistic’ properties affects his acceptance of the 
uncertainty principle, and of the nature of quantons. It is also interesting to notice that both 
Marco and Cheng consciously focused their attention on the formal apparatus and its 
relations with experimental devised, since they both consider QP useful and very effective 
for its technological applications. What they seem to keep faraway is the modelling game 
that the formalism seems to suggest to provide a new interpretation of the world.  
 
2.2.3 Alice: “The ball is round, and the state?” 
Alice is a student from 2016 Castel San Pietro’s experimentation. Her personality shows to 
be always curious and ready to accept the challenge with every topic proposed in 
classroom. She likes to dialogue both with the teachers and her classmates, even if she is 
not sure to have the right answers to give. Alice suffers a slight linguistic fragility, which 
often leads her to not fully comprehend the texts, and which weakens some of her logic 
arguments; for instance, she does not feel comfortable with most of the metaphors proposed 
in the course, mainly because of her tendency to read them literally and to miss the 
appropriate connections. Despite this slight linguistic difficulty, Alice is considered to be 
quite a good student and physics is her favourite subject matter, so that her final 
dissertation was about gravitational waves and general relativity. 
Alice showed a great interest towards QP course, and was the most participating student 
during the lessons. 
Nevertheless, when interviewed, she expressed her difficulties in dealing with QP, some of 
which have still remained unresolved. In particular she felt bothered about the problem of 
imaging the quantum state: 
 
Alice: Quantum physics has been difficult to comprehend in respect to the other 
physics fields, because…it’s a kind of physics that I cannot imagine, or 
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contextualise […]. When we talk about an electron, I know that I cannot see it 
but, at least, I imagine it as it is drawn in the textbook. Quantum physics 
instead…namely, the quantum state is much more difficult to be imagined. 
Interviewer: […] So, how had you imagined the state when we were talking about it in 
classroom? 
Alice: …when you said that the [a particular] state comes to be defined only with a 
measurement…this shocked me a little, because that is not an ‘intrinsic’ 
characteristic, and so I really don’t know how to visualize it… 
[E-8] 
Alice’s idea of comprehension is directly linked to the one of visualisation, as demonstrated 
from her example about the electron. When trying to visualise the quantum state, she 
searches for an intrinsic property that can characterize it and let her to use the imagination. 
We restate here for the word ‘intrinsic’ what still claimed for Marco’s ‘well-defined’ 
properties, as they are indeed tacitly identified with properties held by a state or an object in 
a classical sense: properties that have a single, well-defined value to be discovered through 
measurement. In another extract, to get to the point, she enforces her argumentation through 
a metaphor: 
 
Interviewer: So, what is your concern with the quantum state? 
Alice: I would like to understand better what it is. We didn’t say: the state is this, or 
that…we only talked about some of its features…so to speak, the ball is round, 
and the state? 
[E-9] 
Consistently, the role of measurements in determining the state seems to be an awkward 
point for her conception of science: 
 
Alice:  I was used to think that all scientific subjects had to describe all the 
phenomena with certainty, but this issue of measurements changing the 
state…it makes a little bit perplexed”.  
[E-10] 
Even if not explicitly addressed by Alice herself, as it was instead for Marco and Cheng, we 
are prone to consider her case as a non-acceptance one. In fact, although she seems to have 
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appropriated the teaching proposal, she does not feel comfortable with QP’s description of 
the world, as clearly pointed out in the following: 
 
Alice:  I’m used to think about the world and about reality through classical physics. 
Sure enough, even with relativity I had some difficulties in imaging its 
‘curvatures’…but for me quantum physics requires even a greater effort, 
because it’s a too small world…it’s too abstract. I haven’t fully grasped it 
yet… 
[E-11] 
 
2.3 COGNITIVE NEEDS 
A comparative analysis of the three cases shows some main evidences: (1) all the students 
mention three main conceptual points against which their acceptance clashed, namely the 
concept of quantum object, the superposition state and the uncertainty relations; (2) the 
words used by the students to complain their difficulties can be grouped in three semantic 
fields, namely visualization/imagination, to know more/better, reality/existing. Some key 
expressions that mark problems of acceptance are “to know more about reality”, “to give 
meaning to the formulas”, or “compatibility with reality”, and reveal the need to strengthen 
or establish an interpretative and epistemological connection between the new 
mathematical structure and the world. In some sense it seems that the modelling dimension, 
that is the hypotheses and the features of the new paradigm, is not completely grasped or 
accepted.  
In front of these evidences we tried to recognise if behind non-acceptance there were basic 
cognitive requirements, which were not completely satisfied. As a result of the re-analysis, 
we pointed out the existence of cognitive needs that, we conjectured, could be grouped into 
three main categories: the needs of visualisation, comparability, and ‘reality’, in the 
particular nuances specified in the following sections.  
We moreover conjectured that these needs do not belong only to those students who didn’t 
accept the theory, but also to students that hardly work to accept it. These needs indeed 
seem to represent common cognitive elements; simply, in the context of QP, they clash 
with its deeply non-classical categories, giving rise to possible non-acceptance cases.  
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In order to elaborate the conjecture and to better characterise the cognitive needs, we 
considered excerpts taken from all students, making no difference between their personal 
appropriation or acceptance of QP, as instead was chosen for non-acceptance cases in 
section (2.2). 
As anticipation, we can say that the analysis led us to see that, in all the teaching 
experiences we carried out, what seems to make the difference out is the strength of these 
cognitive requirements and, as a consequence, the ‘degree’ of acceptance strongly 
depended upon each student’s cultural background, idiosyncratic idea of science and 
personality.  
 
2.3.1 Need of visualisation  
The cognitive need of visualisation seems to be one of the most important points students 
complain to be not satisfied in QP. From the interviews, this requirement essentially 
emerges as a sense of lack of mental images or metaphors to “see” processes or objects, or 
even to grasp concepts by intuition. Intuition of physical concepts is very seldom ascribed 
by students to mathematics and formalism and it is perceived as a vey complex and high 
level to reach. Marco (Rimini, 2015), for example, talking about the superposition 
principle, expresses his concerns about this issue as follows: 
 
Marco: In my opinion [these abstract concepts] are only simple mathematical tools, 
which however avoid what is the intuitive problem […]. We need to consider the 
mathematical side to take in account the measurements […]. It’s the best way, 
because intuitively it [facing the problem] would be much more complex. 
[E-12] 
One of the two classes under study in Levrini and Fantini (2013), where formalism was 
recognised from all the students as necessary to understand, generally recognized in the 
issue of visualisation of quantum phenomena a clear-cut point of detachment from classical 
physics. This generated a lively discussion in class, where different positions came to light. 
The case of Jessica is particularly interesting in this perspective.  
 
Luca:  The picture of microscopic reality, in this case, is sufficiently supplied by the 
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mathematical formalism. Therefore, in my opinion, to have a graphical 
representation is not important for scientific progress: What’s the use of the 
graphical representation? It may help in explaining the object as it is to children. 
But mathematics already explains it. […] In my opinion anyway, the picture of 
microscopic reality is already described well enough by mathematics. It is enough 
to have the tools for comprehending it and it seems to me that everyone can do 
so… 
 […] 
Jessica:  But for me it [visualization] is necessary in order to understand… 
Luca:  Ah, but what if you can’t do it… 
Jessica: Because it is impossible to talk about something without trying to have a picture 
of what we are talking about, even unconsciously. It may help, in my opinion, also 
to give a meaning to formulas, because otherwise, even if we say that it is 
nonsense to represent the microscopic object, we make a picture anyway… I think 
so, although we decide not to draw it because we don’t want to give a model 
that…[…] it helps me, it helps me to remember. […] honestly I can explain the 
Compton effect by keeping in mind the drawing. […] we know that to be untrue 
but… 
Pietro:  Ok, but it is just an icon, you could draw a little star to make a photon. 
Jessica: Yes, exactly. 
[E-13] 
When saying “…to have a graphical representation is not important for scientific process”, 
Luca is accepting the impossibility to visualize quantum phenomena, founding his 
confidence in the possibility of scientific progress, and refusing any other need of 
description: “…the picture of microscopic reality is already described well enough by 
mathematics”.  
Jessica, instead, ascribes to her need of visualization a necessary role for understanding: the 
formalism has to be interpreted in terms of pictures, and being pictures implicitly connected 
with classical world, this allows for the use of ordinary language.  
She restates many times that pictures does not have to be a ‘true’ representation of reality 
itself, as “a little star” isn’t a fitting model of the photon; but visualisation, for Jessica, is an 
obliged way to travel through in order to face her necessity to “give meaning to the 
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formulas”, to interpret the formalism in a more intuitive way, to talk about the model. As 
said before, this requirement for a meaning, seems to strongly influence students’ 
acceptance of QP. 
The authors of the article point out that this personal requirement someway recall the 
position interpreted by Schrödinger in the historical debate about formulations of Quantum 
Mechanics, as underlined in de Regt (1997): 
 
“The association of visualizability with understanding rather than with realism may be 
elucidated by considering the German word Anschaulichkeit, which is the term Schrödinger 
used in his writings. This word does not only mean ‘visualizability’ but also ‘intelligibility’” 
 
This connection between visualisation and intelligibility was for Schröedinger not only a 
useful way to comprehend the content of a theory, but concerned the very aim of science 
research itself: visualisation was considered not only a method, but quite a task, as can be 
seen from this extract (de Regt, 1997]: 
 
“Physics does not consist only of atomic research, science does not consist only of physics, 
and life does not consist only of science. The aim of atomic research is to fit our empirical 
knowledge concerning it into our outer thinking. All of this other thinking, so far as it 
concerns the outer world, is active in space and time. If it cannot be fitted into space and 
time, then it fails in its whole aim and one does not know what purpose it really serves” 
 
This strong line of though isn’t of course consciously taken from students as a 
philosophical stance, and indeed neither entirely in its methodological and epistemological 
implications, but still emerges from their words a strong connection between visualisation 
and understanding.  
 
Another clear example of the need of visualisation is the case of Alice, as she express in the 
excerpts [E-8] and [E-11]. This need links her appropriation of quantum theory to the 
possibility to visualise the quantum state and she complains her difficulty in the lack of 
‘intrinsic’ properties.  In this case it is crucial that Alice focuses her attention on the “state”, 
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since this is a clear signal that Alice made a sort of ontological shift from the object to the 
state, but she needs to finalise and strengthen such a shift. This is a point deeply addressed 
in the next chapter. 
The case of Federico (Rimini, 2015) is also interesting since he appropriated the basic 
concepts but he however felt that his acceptance process was not accomplished, since his 
imagination was stuck: he was not able to build a comprehensive picture (“image”) that 
could sum up the logic connections between the concepts: 
 
Federico: […] Personally I’m still quite confused about uncertainty, I’m still quite 
confused… 
Interviewer: About what exactly? […] I would say that you have well understood it. So, 
what is not yet clear? 
Federico:  The problem is this: […] it is difficult to conceptualize this modern concepts 
after have been exposed, let’s say, to a whole classical path… 
Interviewer:  Then you’re saying: I cannot imagine them. 
Federico:  Yes, I cannot imagine them, therefore sometimes I repeat [the concepts] only 
because I’ve heard them, I’ve studied them, but sometimes… I loose the logic 
connections between these concepts. 
[E-14] 
Although Federico seems he well understood the formal implications of uncertainty 
relations, he still feels a kind of concern about it. Federico is searching for a deeper and 
more comprehensive conceptualization, which is strongly linked to what he call 
imagination and that is deeply different to represent the quantum object through a familiar 
picture. Visualization is hence a deep cognitive need that refers to requirement to have a 
synthetic view able to guide and orient reasoning so as to guarantee its inner logic 
consistency. 
The same connection between intelligibility and visualisation stands out, even if more 
implicitly, in the words of Anna (Rimini, 2015). When asked, during the final interview, 
about her images of quantum objects, she answered as follows: 
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Anna: In my head I’ve no ideas about the quanton […], I’ve not a clear image in mind. 
[…] But I’ve made up the idea that this is quite a new stuff, and it seems almost 
unreachable, as it is not to be understood… 
[E-15] 
Although Anna seems not to be prevented by her need of visualisation for accepting 
quantum theory, she clearly considers the image of ‘quanton’ at the same level of her 
understanding of the latter, of having an intelligible and comprehensive view to 
conceptualize it; as she cannot reach a clear image or idea of the ‘quanton’, it cannot be 
properly understood. It is also interesting that her personal justification for this 
impossibility, and the resulting acceptance of it, comes from her fascination for the cultural 
challenge she wants to accept for herself by removing all the ‘prejudices’ that, as she states, 
belong to classical physics’ categories (her particular case of acceptance is analysed also in 
paragraph 3.2.2). 
 
2.3.2 Need of comparability 
The second need we pointed out behind the students’ words concerns comparability, that is 
the cognitive need of bridging, both formally and imaginatively, quantum world to the 
classical one, so as to allow imagination to move from one to the other. In fact, the absence 
of a real demarcation line between classical and quantum domains often prevents this 
requirement to be fully satisfied in students’ conceptions. As a consequence, students like 
Marco or Cheng still perceive the two domains completely detached from each other, and 
the quantum formalism comes to be a ‘trick’ to account for the experimental results without 
really interpreting the world.   
Federico (Rimini, 2015), for example, when asked to compare his studies about QP to the 
others, answers as follows: 
 
Federico: […] In the past two years [Federico was exposed to the experimentation about 
relativity in the previous year] my idea of physics has changed from the one 
where science had to determine everything, calculate, and tell us everything 
with certainty. Science has become an endless research of truths; truths that 
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have to be proved wrong, or even made more true, by the following theory 
[…]. 
Interviewer: Yes. In fact in your essay you were claiming that it’s not clear yet how is 
possible the coexistence between classical and quantum worlds, with such 
great differences… 
Federico: Yes, that’s an issue I dealt with. […] What I can’t explain it’s how could they 
coexist, but just as how could relativity and classical mechanics coexist. […] 
This is closer to philosophy than to physics! Or maybe this is true physics, I 
don’t know. 
[E-16] 
In dealing with relativity and QP, as they were proposed in classroom, Federico’s idea of 
science has been enriched and enlarged from those limits that were given to be fixed in 
classical domains. Science’s development assumed the image of a dynamical process, 
where ‘truths’ are always to be questioned and deepened; this new horizon demanded for 
fixing possible relationships between different theories and domains.  
This very issue is one of the aspects that we attach to the need of comparability, and of 
course it emerges when students are asked to look beyond the wall of classical categories, 
being them the speed of light or the continuous nature of physical processes. 
Federico is facing his need for a ‘coexistence’ of the different theories, probably making 
the implicit assumption that all of them are needed to explain the whole reality but he is 
certainly searching for a connection between them. It’s interesting, from this perspective, 
what Federico states about everyday reality: 
 
Federico: The difficulty I encountered is, as I said before, that quantum concepts are so 
much distant from the Newtonian reality we experience every day. 
[E-17] 
What is lacking to Federico is an explicit connection between the daily experience, which is 
to him undoubtedly assumed to be Newtonian, and the new quantum concepts (like 
discreteness of the process or abstract spaces, as himself will point out in other excerpts). 
Thus, the problem here goes beyond the need to establish a connection from the formalism 
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to its corresponding phenomenology: It seems to express the need to find a bridge between 
different theoretical “worlds”. 
On this way, it’s also interesting what Silvia (Levrini & Fantini, 2013) points out during a 
discussion led in classroom: 
 
Silvia:  In relativity it was different […] there you have a demarcation line. If you 
apply our velocity in formulas, you re-find our formulas. [In relativity] the two 
things are compatible, here not. […] In relativity, in my opinion, there was a 
greater compatibility with reality. 
[E-18] 
As Levrini and Fantini highlight in their analysis: “without such a demarcation line and 
hence a comparative criterion, the quantum formalism risks becoming nothing but a 
“mechanism”, “a mentality” (Silvia) to jump into, lacking what she felt to be a way for 
making the worlds comparable. 
 Silvia (like Federico) was not compelling the impossibility of projecting classical images 
on the quantum world. She was instead manifesting the need of making the two ‘worlds’, 
however different, comparable, where comparability includes also the knowledge of where 
one fades in the other” (Levrini & Fantini, 2013).  
Comparativeness seems to be, like visualization, another way to travel within the quantum 
world without feeling to get lost and to express in a not simplistic way the wish to reduce 
quantum world to the classical one. More than visualization, comparativeness seems to 
belong to the epistemological level regarding modelling and the features of the 
interpretative apparatus (the “world”) that the new theory has built; apparatus that a 
contrastive approach with other “worlds” can highlight.  
 
 
2.3.3 Need of ‘reality’ 
This last cognitive need we saw behind students’ words refers to the request for the 
quantum description to be more tied with ‘reality’, in the different nuances this word has 
for the students. This needs emerges quite systematically when talking about the quantum 
object, the superposition state and the uncertainty principle.  
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Andrea (Bagno di Romagna, 2015), for example, when asked about the nature of ‘quanton’, 
answers: 
 
Andrea: [This is] a word quite particular to describe it, but maybe it could be said to be 
mysterious, as up to now it’s difficult to define what it really is; we don’t know 
yet how to define it well, if particle, wave, or something which lies outside both 
natures. 
 […] ‘quanton’ is a totally new kind of thing, it’s difficult to tell its properties… 
it’s something that is not well definable. 
[E-19] 
In the attempt to find a definition of quantum objects Andrea implicitly makes the 
assumption of considering the words ‘property’ and ‘definition’ as strictly linked to 
classical quantities, associable to the object at any instant. In order to reach a more 
‘realistic’ identification of the quanton, imagination searches for those classical-like 
properties on which students are used to rely and, thus, consider more ‘real’. 
Cheng in [E-5 and E-6] repeat the same need of more reality several times and in ways very 
similar to Marco (Rimini, 2015), as reported in the extract [E-2] about the uncertainty 
principle (“The point is that I couldn’t understand how couldn’t a body have its own 
properties, well-defined properties…”), and in [E-1] on the superposition state (“the object 
itself does own a well-defined property, that’s what I believe. […] As Einstein, mine 
postulate is that an object has to embody well-defined properties”).  
These positions seem somehow recall Einstein’s position on the concept quantum state, 
although indeed with a more conscious philosophical stance (Einstein, 1953): 
 
“I am not ashamed to put the concept of «real state of a physical system» [“existing 
objectively, independently of any observation or measure, and that can in principle 
be described through the means of expression of physics”] at the very centre of my 
meditation” 
 
This requirement also appears in Alice’s interview as a need of ‘intrinsic’ properties, as she 
says in [E-8] and [E-10]. What is interesting is the generality of this cognitive need, 
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concerning all kind of properties associable with physical objects, including for example 
spin (as it is for Stern-Gerlach experiment), that is exquisitely quantum-like.  
As can be seen also from the following quotation (Levrini & Fantini, 2013), the need of 
reality (more than the previous needs) emerges when very precise conceptual topics are 
addressed: the topics like uncertainty and the superposition state that mark the fall of 
classical determinism: 
 
Simone:  The hardest point to understand has been giving up classical determinism […] 
Deterministic physics was an exact science, at least at a theoretical level. 
Quantum mechanics is upsetting since it requires facing the knowledge 
problem, it makes you ask if what we observe is really what it is. 
[E-20] 
 
2.3.4 Cases of hard-won acceptance 
By cases of ‘hard-won’ acceptance we mean those cases in which students’ disposition 
seemed to change due to a post-reflection, both on the arguments and on themselves. We 
chose to report and analyse two particular cases, as they point out how some students, 
despite being dealing with their cognitive needs, found a personal justification for 
(partially) accepting QP. 
 
! Anna: “We have to remove our prejudices” 
Anna, attending at our last experimentation in Rimini, seems a case of significant 
understanding of almost all of the arguments proposed and she seems also to have accepted 
QP.  
When talking about the quanton, she explicitly declares the impossibility of visualising it, 
but she can find a personally acceptable justification in her disposal to admit that QP is a 
new world where classical categories fail: 
 
Anna: I haven’t any idea of the quanton in my head… […] Actually, I don’t have a 
clear image in mind. […] However I developed the idea that it is something 
completely new, and it seems almost unreachable, not to be understood…[…]  
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…we entered a new world that we have to discover. 
[E-21] 
 
Also when speaking about superposition principle, she ascribes her difficulty to some 
prejudices which have to be faced off:  
 
Anna:  ... for Quantum Physics it [the atom in Stern-Gerlach experiment] is in a 
superposition state […], but indeed this is something very difficult to think 
about. […] Namely, it’ quite shocking, because… we have such a lot 
prejudices, also Einstein told so…” 
[E-22] 
 
During the interview she constantly returns on this point: “we are in an entirely new 
world”. Her conceptual needs seem to be overcame by a sort of personal challenge she 
feels to herself: 
 
Anna: We have to remove our prejudices. […] However, it is difficult, because in 
the past years we followed a path where we completely trusted science, “I 
don’t even demonstrate it to you, because that’s so”, “Ah ok, well, so let’s 
study it this way…” 
[…] 
Interviewer: Then, do you bring home something [from this experience]? 
Anna: The ‘quanton’! I bring home it [laughing]…meaning that… Also with 
Quantum Physics, and even before with Relativity, but certainly more in 
Quantum Physics, you bring home the fact that [you find yourself saying]: 
“Then it isn’t as I though…”. That is, you don’t merely have to fix some 
concepts in your head… a part from demonstrations, which I’ve always 
wanted to do, but… some issues are not demonstrable, you have to deal 
with this. 
[E-23] 
 
Anna’s personality seems to be very shy, hence her approach may appear to be part of her 
attitude of accepting QP since she never tries to impose personal commitments. 
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Nevertheless from her statements, which are not incidental as they were repeated in many 
different ways throughout the interview, she seems to accept it mainly because of the 
cultural challenge she feels to herself. Anna doesn’t talk explicitly of the new ontology and 
it is not clear what she ascribes to the quantum world as deeply new. Anyway, her 
fascination for this cultural challenge leads her to accept giving up classical world and to 
avoid any resistance to maintain it.  
We are prone to think that this was facilitated by the teaching path itself, as it was 
constructed on the very idea of supporting students’ involvement, by creating a rich, 
challenging and complex learning environment. In fact, as pointed out in Levrini & Fantini 
(2013), some forms of complexity can be productive for students’ learning processes and 
unavoidable difficulties can be transformed in cultural challenges. This fact is strongly 
confirmed by the general results about students’ involvement with the proposal (Stefanini, 
2013), which revealed to be widely transversal to their personal scientific inclination: 
building up the materials for achieving a properly complex learning environment, seems to 
really facilitate not only the appropriation (Lodovico, 2016) of the teaching proposal, but 
also the acceptance of it.  
 
! Luigi and Michele: reorganizing relations between math and physical properties 
In the experimentation conducted in 2012 in Rimini and reported in Levrini and Fantini 
(2013), a lively discussion about the crisis of determinism was generated and developed 
around the following questions: should “real” be synonymous of “determined”, “know in 
all detail”, “know with certainty”? Why should a description based on uncertainty, on a 
“non-epistemic probability” be less realistic than a classical one? These are somehow the 
core questions that led Marco and Cheng (see section 2.2) to not accept Quantum Theory. 
The discussion was led by Luigi and Michele: 
 
Luigi:  I think that realism is not lost. I mean that what we are talking about is something 
real and is not metaphysical, therefore realism is not excluded. We are talking 
about something that, so to say, is undeterminable because it has a non-epistemic 
probability. Realism is not excluded anyway; on the contrary it is defined in 
another way… let’s say on the basis of its probability instead of its certainty. 
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Mathematics (in this case) allows us to explain the superposition principle, the 
principle of uncertainty. And that’s what I found somehow difficult to understand: 
how mathematics gave us an explanation of how nature is not something exact but 
is instead undeterminable. 
Michele:  I think Luigi pointed out that mathematics has never been associated with the 
concept of realism, it has always been abstraction. Mathematics has always given 
us certainty, something certain and computable. So mathematics providing here a 
concept of probability and uncertainty can be a little disconcerting. But when has 
mathematics ever been associated with realism? It has always been abstraction, 
model. 
[E-24] 
 
In the quotation above Luigi and Michele face the posed questions by re-thinking and 
reorganizing the relations between math and reality. For Luigi, “Realism is not lost”, it is 
just “defined in another way”. 
The authors specify that Luigi probably uses the word ‘realism’ just for stressing the link to 
reality, without referring to its philosophical nuances. To him the main difficulty does not 
belong to mathematics itself, but in conceiving that mathematics gives us “an explanation 
of how nature is not something exact but is instead undeterminable” (Luigi). Michele then 
properly clarifies what is hidden in Luigi’s discomfort: “Mathematics has never been 
associated with the concept of realism”, namely, he points out the possible and undue 
association between math’s certainty and “realism”. As pointed out by the authors, “the 
detachment of maths from a strict and trivial link to reality led Luigi and Michele to find 
(even with a little discomfort) a new space of freedom for allowing maths to embody 
probability and uncertainty and to problematize the relationship between determinism 
(certainty) and realism”.  
This little episode confirms the strength of the cognitive needs like the need of reality and 
of comparability in students’ learning processes, but at the same time points out that 
students can find personal justifications for accepting QP, as it is for Luigi and Michele 
who arrived to reconceptualise the relationship between maths and physics. 
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2.3.5 Remarks on the cognitive needs 
The analysis pointed out specific challenges that students have to address to accept QP: 
the challenge to build a comprehensive view (need of visualisation), the challenge to 
recognise the features of the new world with respect to the others (need of 
comparability) and the challenge to reconceptualise how the mathematical formalism is 
related to the real word (need of reality). These challenges imply a wide and 
multidimensional re-arrangement of knowledge on different dimensions, that is 
imagination/perceptual, epistemological and ontological; in other words, what is implied 
is a process of positioning the new theory with respect to: (i) one’s own way of imaging 
the world,  (ii) other physical theories (other possible models) and (iii) reality.  
To get it in simple characterising questions, the cognitive needs could be expressed as 
follows: 
Need of visualisation: how can I imagine the quantum world?  
Need of reality: how is its modelling related to reality? 
Need of comparability: to what extent is it different from the classical one?  
 
The students who appropriated the teaching proposal and are able to accept the theory 
are usually students very attracted by the intellectual challenges and by the conceptual 
changes. They are moreover fascinated by the power of knowledge in designing new 
worlds. Yet, the students who appropriated the contents but didn’t accept completely the 
theory clashed against their resistance in changes and/or against deep knowledge 
problems; we are prone to say that the learning path can be improved in order to support 
also this type of students to satisfy their cognitive needs. 
The analysis pointed out specific topics deserving an explicit revision: the definition of 
the uncertainty relations, the superposition principle and their relations with the 
definition of quantum object. 
The questions addressed in the next chapter are: why did the teaching path fail to satisfy 
the cognitive needs we pointed out? How do other proposals address the issue? Are they 
more effective, as for the specific aim to satisfy the cognitive needs? How can we 
improve our proposal so as to support more students in addressing their own challenges? 
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And, more in general, what interpretative issues can be introduced and explicitly address 
for cognitive reasons? 
 
	   	  
	  
	  
	  
51	  
CHAPTER 3   
Re-thinking some critical points of Bologna’s 
proposal 
 
 
 
This chapter aims at individuating the most critical points of Bologna’s path. In particular, 
we will focus on the topics which the analysis reported in Chapter 2 stressed as the most 
demanding for students: the uncertainty relations (3.1), the superposition principle (3.3) 
and their relation with the definition of quantum object.  
The proposed cognitive needs will be operationally used as analytic tools for rereading 
students’ reactions to the teaching proposal and individuating the specific details against 
which acceptance dynamics clashed.  
For each topic, we briefly report how it was addressed in Bologna’s path and students’ 
specific reactions; then, we sketch the panorama of the research’s literature to present the 
main didactical stances on the interpretative debate that has been occurring on these issues 
within the scientific community. On the basis of this triangulation between empirical results 
and literature, some specific suggestions to improve our path will be pointed out. 
 
3.1 UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS 
3.1.1 Uncertainty relations in Bologna’s path (2015-16) 
The approach to uncertainty principle chosen by the Bologna research group aimed to 
highlight some epistemological dimensions belonging to the quantum description of the 
world: the introduction of a non-epistemic probability, the fall of the principle of causality 
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and of the concept of trajectories, the existence of ‘conjugated’ variables and the ‘active’ 
role of the measurement process. The slant given for introducing these fundamental themes 
was mainly historical-like, as it was based upon the Heisenberg’s article (Heisenberg, 1927) 
“On the intuitive content the quantum kinematics and mechanics” and the debate with Bohr 
around the gamma rays microscope’s thought experiment.  
 
The specific order in which uncertainty relations were presented is approximately (as it has 
always to be appropriated and re-organized by teachers themselves) the following. 
 
! They are introduced in the junction part, before the main formal concepts have been 
developed in the pars construens, and presented in their most famous formulation: 
 
Δ𝑥Δ𝑝 ≥
1
2ℏ 
 
The focus is on the epistemological role addressed to them by Heisenberg himself, who 
explicitly talks about the “intuitive content” of quantum theory, giving also a precise 
definition of intuition: “We believe to intuitively comprehend a physics’ theory when we’re 
able to think qualitatively about its experimental consequences in all of the simplest cases, 
and when, at the same time, we recognize that the application of the theory does not imply 
any inner contradiction”.  
 
! A critical analysis of Heisenberg’s gamma ray microscope (Heisenberg, 1927) is 
proposed to students, underlying the operationalist stance of his approach. This choice has 
been agreed with teachers of the research group, as most of the textbooks still make use of 
this argument as the most characterizing uncertainty principle, despite all the critics 
addressed to it up until 1927. As suggested in (Hadzidaki, 2006), Heisenberg’s thought 
experiment, if critically analysed and contextualised in the historical debate with Bohr, can 
serve to “lead learners to an essential understanding of QM worldview”. The choice is 
therefore to show not only its potentialities but also, and mainly, its limits, and in particular 
the two main weak points of Heisenberg’s interpretation: his insistence on a disturb effect, 
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bounded to an epistemic view of the uncertainty relation, and an underestimation of the 
non-separability of the object with the experimental set-up. The ‘disturb interpretation’ 
hides the implicit idea that the object does own precise values of position and velocity 
before the measurement and that the indeterminacy on velocity is produced by the act of 
localizing the electron through the gamma ray; in this sense the uncertainty would be 
experimental and not ontological. Bohr’s critics to Heisenberg’s interpretation is here 
touched upon (also through some video extracts taken from “Copenhagen” (Frayn, 2009)) 
in terms of complementarity, which he believed to be the real ground for explaining 
uncertainty relations.  
 
! From complementarity, the existences of ‘conjugated’ variables is introduced, as to 
get closer to the modern interpretation of uncertainty principle, formally derived in 1929 by 
Robertson (Robertson, 1929) for non-commuting operators. This part aims at arguing that, 
as pointed out from Levy-Leblond and Balibar, “while for classical entities the physical 
properties take on unique and determined numerical values, for quantons [quantum objects] 
they are characterised by numerical spectra, extended sets of numerical values” (Levy-
Leblond, Balibar, 1990), that for the case of pairs of non-commuting observables do exhibit 
correlations between their distribution amplitudes (as it is for example between the spatial e 
the momentum distributions).  
In order to give an intuitive idea of this interpretation on uncertainty principle, a metaphor 
is proposed and analysed with students: the ‘Chinese menu’, taken from a well-known text 
of Brian Green (Green, 2004): 
 
“To understand it [the uncertainty principle], think of the prix-fixe menus in certain 
Chinese restaurants. Dishes are arranged iin two columns, X and B, and if, for 
example, you order the first dish in column A, you are not allowed to order the first 
dish in column B; if you order the second dish in column A, you are not allowed to 
order the second dish in column B, and so forth. In this way, the restaurant has set up 
a dietary dualism, a culinary complementarity (one, in particular, that is designed to 
prevent you from piling up the most expensive dishes). On the prix-fixe menu you can 
have Peking Duck or Lobster Cantonese, but not both. Heisenberg's uncertainty 
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principle is similar. It says, roughly speaking, that the physical features of the 
microscopic realm (particle positions, velocities, energies, angular momenta, and so 
on) can be divided into two lists, A and B. And as Heisenberg discovered, knowledge 
of the first feature from list A fundamentally compromises your ability to have 
knowledge about the iirst feature from list B; knowledge of the second feature from 
list A fundamentally compromises your ability to have knowledge of the second 
feature from list B; and so on. Moreover, like being allowed a dish containing some 
Peking Duck and some Lobster Cantonese, but only In proportions that add up to the 
same total price, the more precise your knowledge of a feature from one list, the less 
precise your knowledge can possibly be about the corresponding feature from the 
second list. The fundamental inability to determine simultaneously all features from 
both lists-to determine with certainty all of these features of the microscopic realm-is 
the uncertainty revealed by Heisenberg's principle”. 
 
! The following point of the path in which students meet uncertainty is in the Stern-
Gerlach (SG) experiment performed with multiple magnets in series, in the particular 
disposition below (McIntyre, 2013): 
 
 
 
 
Figura 3.1: Stern-Gerlach magnets in series. The results are a consequence of 
uncertainty principle, as observables Sx and Sz do not commute. 
 
In this context uncertainty occurs for Sz and Sx spin components (Ag atoms are used). This 
case is discussed to stress that Heisenberg’s inequality does hold for all pairs of non-
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commuting observables, and not only for position and momentum (which represent only a 
particular case of canonically conjugated variables). The extension of the validity of 
uncertainty to operators that do not have a classical equivalent, as it is for spin, is used to 
someway overtake Bohr’s complementarity and, at the same time, to strengthen the concept 
of incompatible observables. As to better understand the meaning of these results, a further 
metaphor is proposed, “Erwin’s socks” (McIntyre, 2013): 
 
“It was a dark and stormy night. Erwin huddled under his covers as he had done 
numerous times that summer. As the wind and rain lashed at the window, he feared 
having to retreat to the storm cellar once again. The residents of Erwin's apartment 
building sought shelter whenever there were threats of tornadoes in the area. While it 
was safe down there, Erwin feared the ridicule he would face once again from the 
other school boys. In the rush to the cellar, Erwin seemed to always end up with a 
random pair of socks, and the other boys teased him about it mercilessly. 
Not that Erwin hadn't tried hard to solve this problem. He had a very simple 
collection of socks – black or white, for either school or play; short or long, for either 
trousers or lederhosen. After the first few teasing episodes from the other boys, Erwin 
had sorted his socks into two separate drawers. He placed all the black socks in one 
drawer and all the white socks in another drawer. Erwin figured he could determine 
an individual sock's length in the dark of night simply by feeling it, but he had to have 
them pre-sorted into white and black because the apartment generally lost power 
before the call to the shelter. 
Unfortunately, Erwin found that this pre-sorting of the socks by colour was 
ineffective. Whenever he reached into the white sock drawer and chose two long 
socks, or two short socks, there was a 50% probability of any one sock being black or 
white. 
The results from the black sock drawer were the same. The socks seemed to have 
"forgotten" the colour that Erwin had determined previously. Erwin also tried sorting 
the socks into two drawers based upon their length, without regard to colour. When 
he chose black or white socks from these long and short drawers, the socks had also 
"forgotten" whether they were long or short. After these fruitless attempts to solve his 
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problem through experiments, Erwin decided to save himself the fashion 
embarrassment, and he replaced his sock collection with a set of medium length 
brown socks. However, he continued to ponder the mysteries of the socks throughout 
his childhood.  
After many years of daydreaming about the mystery socks, Erwin Schrödinger 
proposed his theory of "Quantum Socks" and become famous. And that is the 
beginning of the story of the quantum socks”. 
 
3.1.2  Empirical findings 
! Persisting ‘disturb’ interpretation 
Undoubtedly, the most significant finding is about the didactical use of Heisenberg’s 
microscope. Even though the analysis of the though experiment has been widely 
investigated from its experimental and epistemological dimensions, and critically 
contextualised within (and beyond) the historical discussion with Bohr, it seems to persist 
in students the idea of uncertainty as being produced by a measurement disturb. For 
example, in Federico’s interview (extended extract [E-14]): 
 
Federico: What I understood is that when you enlighten an electron to take a 
measurement, you give it some energy and so the measurement you take is no 
more the one you had to take…[…] About the microscope argument, even if, I 
repeat it, I still have to understand it mathematically at 100%, conceptually I 
understood that the problem of enlightening this electron is that it [the act of 
enlightening] changes its conditions, and so you take no more a measurement 
on the electron you had to measure. [It’s] a changed electron, with more 
energy. 
Interviewer: But then you’re interpreting uncertainty as given by a disturb effect…[…] 
Federico: The problem is that the concept of uncertainty is itself uncertain […], I know 
that uncertainty is ‘ontological’ and I know that it is not experimental, like, 
let’s say, the one I’ve just described you. […] Personally I’m still a bit 
confused about uncertainty. 
Interviewer:  About what, exactly? […] Because I would say that you well understood it. 
What is not yet clear? 
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Federico:  The problem is this: […] it is difficult to conceptualize these modern concepts 
after have been exposed, let’s say, to a whole classical path… 
Interviewer:  Then you’re saying: I cannot imagine them. 
Federico:  Yes, I cannot imagine them, therefore sometimes I repeat [the concepts] only 
because I’ve heard them, I’ve studied them, but sometimes… I loose the logic 
connections between these concepts. 
 
The excerpt is only an example of what should be properly considered a tendency in our 
students’ conceptions about uncertainty. Although Federico claims to be ‘in theory’ aware 
of the ‘ontological’ (in the sense of ‘implicated from the foundations of the theory’) nature 
of Heisenberg’s relations, his imagination, and his explanation, is still trapped in a semi-
classical image, close to the Heisenberg’s one about the microscope. He seems to be 
searching for a reliable handhold to definitely give up the ‘disturb’ interpretation and 
consciously coordinate all the pieces of knowledge he has, but he can’t find it in any of the 
proposed argumentations.  
So, even if criticised, Heisenberg’s reasoning seems to be so strong to remain in students’ 
conceptions as still acceptable and, probably due to the absence of a strong cognitive 
ground upon which to build a new interpretation, the non-epistemic nature of uncertainty 
remains only a secondary epistemological shade. This approach failed in supporting several 
students to address their cognitive needs since, on one hand, no comprehensive view was 
suggested to replace the classical one (need of visualisation) and, on the other hand, a sharp 
detachment from classical views is stressed without providing enough constructive 
comparative criteria (need of comparability). 
 
! Ontology, rather than uncertainty 
Another difficulty that emerges also in Federico’s words concerns the problem of accepting 
the real ‘nature’ of uncertainty: it not only fixes a limit to the precision with which couples 
of observables can be known, but someway restates the matrix nature of observables 
themselves, and of their spectra of values. In these terms, Federico is trying to accept this 
epistemological distinction, as he knows that it is the new interpretation, but he cannot find 
a cognitive support to take it as his personal explanation. This can be clearly noticed also in 
Marco’s disappointment in extract [E-2], which we report here again: 
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Interviewer: […] What was the most useful way for you to comprehend the meaning of 
quantum uncertainty in its revolutionary holding? 
Marco: So… if I have to be honest, no one. 
Interviewer: None of these [he had listed them before]? 
Marco: All of these partly contributed, but none has given me a thorough explanation. 
Namely, what I was searching for as an explanation, I haven’t found it in any 
of these.  
Marco:  […] [I was in] a great confusion, not mostly because of the mathematic part, 
[in fact] I could understand the concepts the teacher was talking about, […] 
they were logically comprehensible. The point is that I couldn’t understand 
how couldn’t a body have its own properties, well-defined properties… 
  
Marco’s concern does not relate to uncertainty’s experimental implications, but to its 
restatement of the ‘superposed’ description of quantum objects’ properties, namely their 
ontology. This particular finding seems to be at the heart of our whole analysis around 
acceptance’s dynamics, and will be highlighted also for what concerns the superposition 
state in section (3.2): there seems to be an ‘ontological’ dimension of learning (which is not 
the philosophical one about the stances upon the ontology of quantum physics, it’s more 
likely a ‘cognitive ontology’) that strongly influences and shapes students’ conceptions and 
mental images. This dimension, as proposed, is expressed in the need of ‘reality’ and it 
seems to have a crucial role in respect to the others for facing non-acceptance. 
The examples show that, when facing uncertainty relations, the common sense of ‘real’ 
seems to get stuck either on the plane of object’s inner properties (as from this latter 
extract) or on the plane of measurement (as also reported for example in [E-8] and [E-10] 
from Alice’s interview): this latter, in fact, cannot be more considered in quantum physics 
(QP) as a passive process, just revealing objects’ own properties, but it takes an active role 
in determining them, even though not classically disturbing the system. 
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3.1.3 Triangulating with literature: teaching the uncertainty principle 
The uncertainty principle seems to have been broadly recognized as one of the most 
difficult issues for almost all the teaching proposals (as also extensively reported by 
Malgieri (2015)).  
Consistently with the findings exposed in (3.1), two main misconceptions have been 
reported in literature concerning uncertainty (see for example Johnston, 1998; Müller, 
2002; Ayene, 2011). The first is of considering the principle as expressing an experimental 
limitation, so that experiments cannot be performed more accurately than a certain limit); 
the second is of individuating the cause of uncertainty in the measurement apparatus itself, 
along the line of Heisenberg’s interpretation of ‘gamma rays microscope’ thought 
experiment.  
As already mentioned, the analysis of some students’ profiles conducted in (Lodovico, 
2016) about Bologna’s 2015 experimentation in Rimini, showed that uncertainty was one 
tough topic that had to be re-thought, and the difficulty was mainly ascribed to the semi-
classical fashion in which students were prone to interpret it, often associated with the 
‘disturb interpretation’. This problematic result led the group to seriously re-consider the 
choice of an historical approach.  
However, the analysis of the literature shows that the issue is still deeper, since similar 
results have been obtained in other studies where the gamma rays experiment was not 
addressed. 
For example, in the experimentation carried out by the research group of Pavia in 2015 
(Malgieri, 2015, chapter 6) the uncertainty principle was the less scored topic in the final 
tests, despite having been improved from the previous experimentations. What is 
interesting in Pavia’s findings is that “a majority of students […] obtains a score of 2 or 
more [between 0 and 4], meaning they are able to identify the basic inadequacy in the 
presentation of the uncertainty principle as a perturbation due to measurement, although 
not always providing valid connections”. This is exactly what was underlined for Federico 
in (3.1.2), who is aware (in theory) that the disturb interpretation is no more acceptable, but 
cannot find a cognitive ground on which to build up the new interpretation, and logically 
connect it to the obsolete one. What is missing here, as well as in Bologna students, is the 
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confidence with a new ontology of objects and observables. There is the feeling that old 
categories do not work, but the new ones do not sound enough convincing and reliable. 
Also the research group of Udine University, which follows a phenomenological approach 
to QP based upon the polarisation of light and the construction of the concepts of state and 
superposition principle, reports some difficulties in comprehending the consequences of the 
existence of incompatible variables, and in accepting the fall of determinism (Stefanel, 
2007).  
All these results show that a new approach has to be developed and the debate has to be 
moved explicitly to the ontological plane. This point is described in the next section, since 
it concerns also the cognitive problems of accepting quantum superposition principle. We 
only anticipate that by “ontology” we refer to a cognitive dimension and not to a 
philosophical or metaphysical one. Ontology, in our sense, refers to “small” and local 
issues and refers to how students conceptualize the models of objects and physical 
processes and ascribe a sense of existence or reality to elements of the physical description 
(Levrini & diSessa, 2008).  
Dealing with the ontological issue would re-frame the current debate about 
teaching/learning uncertainty relations, that so far has been mainly focused on whether or 
not discussing Heisenberg thought experiment on gamma rays microscope, and to what 
contexts (experiments) seem more appropriate to introduce uncertainty. 
Very briefly, for what concerns Heisenberg’s thought experiment on gamma rays 
microscope, some authors take the clear stance of avoiding any type of reference to the 
uncertainty as produced by a disturbance (Fischler, 1992; Ireson, 2000); some others, 
instead, believe that an adequate introduction to the historical debate with Bohr could 
suffice for providing the critical instruments to accept the new interpretation (Hadzidaki, 
2006; Velentzas, 2011); this was the line chosen also for the development of Bologna’s 
proposal. 
As for the issue of what context seems more appropriate, a recent proposal suggests to 
introduce uncertainty principle in association with the derivation of the ground state energy 
for a particle in a box (Dreyfus, 2015). In other textbooks, instead, uncertainty principle is 
introduced with the analysis of the single-slit diffraction experiment performed with single 
photons (Cutnell, 2007; Halliday 2010), as proposed by Muiño (2000) and by Rioux 
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(2005), and experimentally realized with electrons by Matteucci and co-workers (2010).  
According to our cognitive needs, the analysis has pointed out the following weaknesses of 
our approach: 
! the way we chose to introduce and address Heisenberg’s thought experiment failed 
in providing to students a quantum-like reliable conception of uncertainty, for 
several reasons. On one hand, it resonated with a classical paradigm and the critics 
presented appeared to be mainly destructive; on the other hand, the path emphasised 
too much why the classical interpretation was not acceptable, without providing any 
effective comprehensive picture that students could constructively compare with the 
classical ones; 
! an explicit ontological issue needs to be addressed so as to guide progressively the 
students to shift their attention from the objects, as the basic ontological unit, to the 
states. This is the most important result that also the following discussion on the 
superposition state points out. 
 
3.2 SUPERPOSITION STATE 
3.2.1 Superposition state in Bologna’s path (2015-16) 
In Bologna’s proposal, superposition state was introduced and formally developed through 
the discussion of the “Most beautiful experiment” (MBE) and of Stern-Gerlach sets-up 
(SG). In the way it was introduced, the quantum state played the role, on one hand, of the 
mathematical ground for interpreting the results of some experiments and, on the other 
hand, also of a new descriptive imaginary of the object itself. The main passages (only the 
ones concerning the present discussion, see (1.2) for a general overview) have been 
proposed to students as follows: 
 
! The MBE (presented by Giorgio Lulli (Lulli, 2013), researcher of the CNR-IMM of 
Bologna)3 was the context where a reflection on the difference between quantum and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vrini	  &	  Fantini	  (2013),	  and	  refer	  to	  an	  experimentation	  led	  in	  Rimini	  by	  Paola	  Fantini	  in	  2005	  
e	  teaching	  experiments	  (Lodovico,	  2016).	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classical interference was carried out and where it was qualitatively discussed the notion of 
indistinguishable alternatives and “which path?” (or “which way?”) configurations. 
More specifically, the superposition principle was recalled for classical waves, so as to 
position it at the basis of the interference patterns produced with mechanical waves, or with 
intense beams of photons and electrons. The main massages were that “interference implies 
a superposition principle at its ground” and that, in the classical sense, interference implies 
the presence of two wave sources, as it is in the case of the double-slit set-up. The next step 
was to show that superposition does not necessarily implies waves in a classical sense. The 
crisis of a classical wave paradigm was stressed by comparing what happens when the 
intensity of the beam is progressively reduced until single object, and what the classical 
wave paradigm would have foreseen: instead of having interference fringes progressively 
less and less intense, dots appear. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 
 
Le perturbazioni ondulatorie 
s i  s o m m a n o t r a l o r o 
secondo i l principio di 
sovrapposizione 
In un punto dello spazio 
dove si propagano più 
onde della stessa natura, la 
perturbazione che risulta è 
u g u a l e  a l l a  s o m m a 
( a l g e b r i c a )  d e l l e 
perturbazioni prodotte dalle 
singole onde  
Questo può dare luogo a 
zone in cui la perturbazione 
si rafforza (4A) e zone in cui 
si annulla (4B) 
Principio di sovrapposizione delle onde 
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Figure 3.3 
 
After the presentation of the results obtained with single electrons, the attention was 
focused on the oddity of the interference obtained with single particles, as for classical 
interference there would have been at least two perturbing sources. In order to capture such 
oddity the well-know Dirac’s statement was quoted: “Each photon [or electron] interferes 
with itself” (Dirac, 1947) (see fig. 3.5). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 
onde: principio di 
sovrapposizione  frange 
di interferenza 
 
estensione spaziale, continuità, 
concetto di campo, ... 
risultato dell’esperimento delle 2 fenditure classico 
particelle: meccanica 
newtoniana   due 
strisce 
 
localizzazione spaziale, natura 
discreta, traiettorie, ... 
segnali di particelle .. ma distribuite come nell’interferenza di onde 
effetto che non può essere dovuto a una interazione tra elettroni 
puntini: particelle 
frange interferenza: onde .. un singolo elettrone alla volta 
Giorgio Lulli – CNR-IMM 
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Figure 3.5 
 
As the quantum object must have a peculiar characteristic which could explain the 
interference pattern, the “Which way?” (WW) apparatus was presented to better explore the 
experimental conditions for the interference to occur. In doing so, special emphasis was 
given to stress that these experimental configurations have been designed to not classically 
disturb the system, and as an example the experiment proposed in Scully (1991) was briefly 
described (see fig. 3.6). 
 
 
Figure 3.6 
"ogni fotone [o elettrone] 
interferisce con sè stesso”  
 
 
 
Paul A. M. Dirac I pr incipi del la 
meccanica quantistica (Boringhieri, 
1959) p.13  
•  classicamente, per interferire ci vogliono almeno 
due sorgenti di perturbazioni ondulatorie 
 
•  qui mandiamo un solo elettrone/fotone per volta 
Giorgio Lulli – CNR-IMM 
Elettrone singolo: cosa interferisce con cosa? 
Giorgio Lulli – CNR-IMM 
Schema dell’esperimento concettuale di Scully et al. (1991) in 
cui la determinazione del percorso produce una variazione di 
momento trascurabile sull’atomo 
 
Un esperimento reale che si ispira a questo è stato fatto per la 
prima volta nel 1998 (Durr et al. Nature, 395, 33, 1998) 
NON è colpa del “disturbo” sperimentale, classicamente inteso 
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In order to explain the disappearance of the interference pattern due to the preparation of a 
Which Way set-up, Feynman words were used to point out that we are not talking about a 
classical object: “regardless of the quantum system, any information – recorded or not – 
about the alternative taken by a quantum process capable of following more than one 
alternative, destroys the interference between alternatives” (Feynman, 1965). The 
interference is hence stressed to occur not between classical waves but between 
alternatives, and the electron to form “a world of potentialities, or possibilities” 
(Heisenberg, 1962). In this sense the object can no more be described separately to the 
measurement apparatus, as the measurement process has a crucial role in determining the 
state of the object itself, despite doing so not in a classical fashion (for example practicing a 
force); this exquisitely quantum-like property has been stressed as a form of entanglement 
between the system and the object, even if this terminology didn’t return until the final part 
of the course about the applications of QP. 
 
! The superposition state	  was	   next	   formalised	   in	   the	   context	   of	   SG	   experiments.	  
After	  the	   introductive	  part	  about	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  SG	  magnets,	  were	   it	  was	  
pointed	  out	   that	   a	   SG	  magnet	  works	   exactly	   as	   a	   spin	  analyser	  (as	   the	   atoms’	   beam	  
splits	   in	   two	   separated	   spots),	   a	   phenomenological	   argumentation	  was	   proposed	   in	  
order	  to	  gather	  some	  logical	  conclusions.	  Some	  different	  experimental	  configurations	  
with	  subsequent	  SG	  magnets	  were	  proposed,	  and	   the	  argumentation	  was	  developed	  
as	  follows.	  	  
Performing	  the	  experiment	  with	  only	  one	  SG	  apparatus	  (either	  directed	  along	  the	  x-­‐
axis	  or	  the	  z-­‐axis)	  and	  with	  single	  atoms4,	  three	  annotations	  were	  made:	  
-­‐ each	  atom	  arrives	  either	  in	  the	  upper	  or	  in	  the	  lower	  spot;	  
-­‐ each	  atom	  arrives	  only	  in	  one	  spot;	  
-­‐ if	  repeated	  several	  times,	  half	  atoms	  will	  get	  the	  upper	  spot	  and	  half	  in	  lower.	  So	  
they	  have	  50%	  of	  probability	  to	  be	  revealed	  with	  spin-­‐up	  or	  spin-­‐down.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  following	  images	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  presentation	  	  developed	  by	  E.	  Ercolessi	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Figure	  3.7	  
	  
	  
Here	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  was	  introduced	  for	  describing	  atoms’	  spin	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  
measuring:	  |+ 	  for	  spin-­‐up	  state,	  and	  |− 	  for	  spin-­‐down.	  An	  important	  annotation	  was	  
that,	   given	   this	   situation,	   one	   could	  be	  prone	   to	   think	   that	   the	   atoms	  own	  a	  precise	  
value	  of	   spin	   (spin-­‐up	  or	   spin-­‐down),	  and	   that	   the	  apparatus	   just	   reveal	   it	   as	   it	  was	  
before	   passing	   through	   the	   magnet.	   Afterward,	   some	   more	   complex	   configurations	  
with	  SG	  magnets	  were	  proposed	  and	  analysed	  as	  performed	   in	  several	  experiments,	  
getting	  statistical	  results	  reported	  in	  fig.	  3.8.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.8	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Figure	  3.9	  
	  
After	  the	  configuration	  reported	  in	  figure	  3.3,	  a	  final	  configuration	  (fig.	  3.9)	  was	  given	  
and	  it	  often	  happens	  that	  students	  read	  it	  along	  a	  classical	  “path	  logic”	  and	  foresee	  a	  
result	  of	  50%	  and	  50%,	  different	  from	  what	  experimentally	  observed.	  
 
 
Figure 3.10 
 
The surprising experimental outcomes impose to re-think about our implicit conception of 
property, and a reflection on this point was proposed in giving the question: according to 
classical physics5, what value of spin does the atom own between the two Z magnets? 
-­‐ Both |+  and |− : this is not an acceptable option, as all the experiments confirm that 
atoms do not split up; 
-­‐ Neither |+  nor |− : non acceptable, as all the experiments confirm tha atoms do not 
vanish; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Indeed,	  spin	  is	  not	  a	  classical	  property,	  but	  here	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  stress	  the	  implicit	  classical-­‐like	  
logic	  we	  are	  used	  to	  think	  with	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-­‐ Either |+  or |− : again not acceptable, as the experiment in fig. 3.9 gives different 
outcomes.   
This logical ‘empasse’ is resolved by pointing out that we were making the implicit 
assumption that revealing an atom with spin-up or spin-down meant that before the atom 
did own that particular value of spin.  Dismissing this assumption, the superposition state 
was introduced, as describing a linear combination of the classically admitted alternatives, 
whose coefficients are the corresponding probability amplitudes; it was strongly underlined 
that this description does not belong to anyone of the previous logical option for the atom’s 
spin.  
Some notions about vectors and linear algebra were then resumed. The superposition state 
is expressed as the state vector |+ !: 
 
|+ ! =   𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃|+ ! + 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃|− ! 
 
where 2θ is the angle between the directions of the magnetic field of the two magnets (for 
the case presented, X and Z). In this particular case, being 𝜃 = 45°, we obtain: 
 
|+ ! =   
1
2
|+ ! +
1
2
|− ! 
|− ! =   
1
2
|+ ! −
1
2
|− ! 
 
Assuming this new definition of the state, together with the rules for calculating probability 
amplitudes (multiply in sequence - add for the final amplitude - square to get probability), 
the outcomes were justified and predicted. Finally, for allowing the description of spin 
states directed in any space direction, the more general complex linear combination was 
introduced: 
 
|𝜃,𝜙 ! =   𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃|+ ! + 𝑒!"𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃|− !	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! To extend the validity of quantum states’ formulation, so as to considered it in its 
generality and not only as an ad-hoc method, another experimental set-up was presented: 
the Mach-Zender interferometer (MZ). The apparatus was composed of a low-energy 
photon source, two beam splitters (semi-reflective surfaces, going through which the 
photon has a 50% probability of being reflected or transmitted), two mirrors, and two 
single-photon detectors, arranged as in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 
 
In the first configuration only one beam splitter is adopted and the results (again obtained 
statistically) do fit classical expectations (50% e 50%); therefore it can be perfectly 
explained on the basis of classical optics. But when another beam splitter is interposed, the 
outcome is again not predictable with classical probabilities, as they are explained only 
through the introduction of the superposition quantum state, with probability amplitudes. In 
this sense the beam splitter is completely equivalent to a SG magnet, despite being the two 
systems and the observables physically different. 
 
! It was finally mentioned to students that the superposition state could be used also 
to reinterpret the double-slit interference with single electrons, in terms of all electron’s 
possible paths. In principle there is a different path for every point of the revealing screen, 
and, on varying of the position x, a wave function 𝜓(𝑥) univocally individuate the state 
(and thus the probability amplitude) of the ‘quanton’. 
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3.2.2 Empirical findings 
This section is focused on the critical issues emerged by students’ responses to the teaching 
proposal, with respect to the superposition state. In particular, two critical questions about 
were individuated as mostly preventing acceptance:  
1. How can an object have non-well defined properties (before being measured)? 
2. Where do I find that formula [related to the superposition state] in reality? That is, 
how can an apparent mathematical trick describe familiar physical phenomena? 
After the analyses of the two questions, one minor problem are also highlighted in respect 
to the superposition state. 
 
! How cannot an object have well defined properties (before being measured)? 
It would be redundant to report again all the extracts found on this point (see (2.3.3), in 
particular the case of Marco); we just underline that in students’ words the expression 
‘well-defined properties’ often and tacitly implies ‘classical properties’. This stands clear 
when noticing that students often consider a ‘quanton’ to be in a precise state only when 
measured, and so only when it lies on one of the possible alternatives, on a projected 
vector. As an example, we report only an extract of Alice’s interview (Castel San Pietro, 
2016): 
 
Interviewer: [Regarding the superposition principle] what were you imagining when we were 
talking about it? 
Alice: When you said that the [a particular] state comes to be defined only through 
measurement…this shocked me a little, because that is not an ‘intrinsic’ 
characteristic, and so I really don’t know how to visualize it… 
Interviewer: So what would you say to be the quantum strangeness? 
Alice: That the state is assumed only when measured, and not before. So one cannot 
really say what is it… 
 
Alice is rephrasing what the teacher told her by introducing a key-word: “intrinsic”. With 
‘intrinsic’ Alice seems to refer to the very classical ontology where objects are thought to 
have their own properties, which the act of measuring has to unveil. The superposition is 
	  
	  
	  
71	  
not yet considered as a “real” property that characterizes the whole system (object and 
apparatus). In particular it seems that Alice didn’t move to conceptualize the role of states 
as the main ontological elements that can define quantons: she didn’t make any move to 
think that in QP objects should not be conceptualized as something in a state, but as the 
states themselves. In QP, indeed, completeness shifts from being a property of the object 
(cognitively perceived as the basic unit that keeps together the whole information that we 
can collect from the world) to being a property of the state. This very point, namely the 
ontological shift from object to state, will be deepened in section (4.2).  
 
! Where do I find that formula in reality? 
As highlighted in Stefanini (2013) and Lodovico (2016), the introduction of the 
superposition state seems to have been generally well greeted by students as a logically 
coherent answer for ‘getting the counts fitted in’.  
This point came out through questions posed by the students themselves, like the one we 
reported as title of this section (yet partially discussed in (2.3)). This question raised during 
a lesson (Castel san Pietro, 2016) led by the author of this dissertation, after had deeply 
analysed the state of the two classical alternatives superposition for describing SG 
outcomes. The question had a large consensus in the class when it was posed and, in our 
opinion, the it resonated mainly with both the cognitive needs of visualization and 
comparability. The formal expression of the superposition state per se is not effective for 
several students either to outline an intuitive picture of the new interpretation, or even to 
provide contrastive criteria to compare this interpretation against the classical idea that one 
project on more familiar phenomena. In particular it fails to provide an acceptable 
explanation of the double slit experiment, that offers to the students a more familiar picture 
of reality than the Stern and Gerlach one. 
As we discussed in chapter 2, Marco (Rimini, 2015) for example complained that the 
mathematical definition of quantum state was not enough for supporting imagination and 
intuition [E-12]. Also in the excerpt [E-3], Marco claims for the lack of contact between the 
formalism and the ‘reality’ of phenomena, as he states that to him “the word ‘probability’ is 
quite an ‘escamotage’ [trick] that we use to”. 
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! A minor problem: Why that minus sign?  
A minor problem but still related to ontological issues concern the apparent conventionality 
of the sign when it is introduced in the expression for the components of spin in a given 
direction in SG experiments, which are as follows: 
 
|+ ! =   
1
2
|+ ! +
1
2
|− ! 
|− ! =   
1
2
|+ ! −
1
2
|− ! 
 
The question concerns in particular the reason for choosing the minus sign for the second 
superposition. Indeed, the choice of the sign is perfectly arbitrary, as what matters is only 
the relative phase between the states; but this question seems to hide a more demanding 
issue than the merely mathematical one, mainly because when answered this formally, they 
generally appear to be disappointed. Actually, in our opinion, what students are searching 
for is the physical meaning for that expression to be different from the first one, as they 
have not yet gathered the abstractive power of quantum formalism, which remains only as a 
limitation for understanding.  
 
3.2.3 Triangulating with literature: the ontological shift 
In the following sub-sections, we zoom in on the issue of the ontological shift. It will be 
contextualised both from a physics’ foundations’ point of view, and from a didactical 
research’s one (indeed entangled to each other).  
The first sub-section aims to move the analysis more explicitly from a philosophical to a 
cognitive plane. There are many reasons for this conceptual and methodological choice: (1) 
acceptance seems mainly influenced by cognitive needs, more referred to a ‘cognitive 
ontology’; (2) the debate upon the interpretations of QP sounds too complex and idle for 
the teachers. 
The second sub-section present the main results of an analysis of the teaching approaches to 
QP, that has been carried out with two aims: (1) to better and better characterize the 
“cognitive” ontological shift we are interested in, by distinguishing sources of cognitive 
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difficulties from elements that can instead characterise legitimate epistemological stances; 
(1) to point out where and how the teaching path can be improved.  
 
3.2.3.1 From philosophical interpretations to ‘cognitive ontology’ 
The analysis of students’ reactions stresses the evidence we already pointed out in the 
analysis of uncertainty relations: the crucial role of the ontological plane in learning QP. 
Also here the cognitive need of reality seems to highlight the lack of an accomplished 
‘ontological shift’ from a classical view of a physical object to the quantum one, based on 
the very notion of quantum state.  
This result is not new in physics education research. For example, Mannila & Koponen 
(2001) pointed out that “for students the main difficulty lies in the conceptual shift needed 
in order to form a new ontology”, as they “are used to direct their attention to properties of 
entities (particles, bodies, etc.), create images and draw pictures, where illustrations 
concentrate on the behaviour of entities. A similar approach is very difficult in QP where 
the properties of basic entities are difficult to approach and one should really concentrate on 
properties of phenomena”.  
Moreover, is it well known that these difficulties do present despite students’ confidence 
with the formalism; many of them, in fact, emerge also in students who strongly succeed in 
addressing the mathematical basis required by the courses, as in our own results, where the 
formalism often came to be considered as a mere “mathematical tool”.  
This is what pointed out also in the analysis of Greca & Freire (2003) concerning a course 
of engineering students, where “it seems evident that […] quantum concepts are 
fragmentary or mere mathematical expressions. […] The traditional introductory courses 
approaches do not favour students learning the quantum way of perceiving phenomena; and 
latter courses, more technical ones, also do not seem to succeed in this goal either”.  
Still, the results of the Pavia’s research group confirm that QP’s formalism is not enough to 
facilitate acceptance, as the “students can build satisfying mental models […], accepting 
them at least to the extent of considering them reliable sources for explanations”, but 
“whether they accept them as a definitive description of reality is […] a more definitive 
issue to settle” (Malgieri, 2015, chapter 3).  
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From an historical-epistemological perspective, the most debated point is weather 
conceiving the quantum description as gathering the object in its reality or only as a 
theoretical framework for expressing the rules of our observation of the object; to use the 
words of J. Bell (Bell, 1987), the clash is on what the theory has to be about, observables or 
‘beables’. These issues have been debates throughout decades, starting from the very 
beginning of QP’s development. As it is well known, personalities of the calibre of 
Heisenberg, Born, Bohr, Schröedinger and of course Einstein were deeply engaged in 
resolving these ontological frictions, often guided by their personal epistemological views 
upon physics and science. The debate is still open and somehow vivid. The great number of 
interpretational theoretic frameworks developed through the years for answering these 
issues witnesses the actuality of QP’s interpretive problem. A complete review of these 
frameworks is definitely out of the purposes of this dissertation, but we want to mention 
again the recent study conducted in 2013 by M. Shlosshauer and colleagues (Shlosshauer, 
Kwiat & Zeilinger, 2013). It shows very clearly the lack of consensus on the foundational 
themes of QP, and in particular about the philosophical interpretation of quantum objects’ 
ontology.  
The incredibly various panorama of interpretations, together with the actual widespread 
disagreement upon this kind of themes, impedes teachers to gather a precise stance on 
them, and creates a general concern about dealing with these issues. Furthermore, our own 
empirical results do not concern (so much) philosophical issues and conceptions, but 
instead, as yet pointed out, the cognitive need to “form a new ontology” (Mannila & 
Koponen, 2001) for accepting QP and relating it with the others fields of physics 
knowledge.  A similar discovery was carried out in the teaching/learning of special 
relativity where most of the documented difficulties in understating the relativistic effects 
were traced to the lack of an ontological shift from “looking on terms of objects and 
phenomena” to “looking in terms of events” (Levrini & diSessa, 2008). In the cited paper 
the authors used the term “ontological” for a description that they felt is apt for the naïve 
idea that “something” exists and has somehow intrinsic properties. In special relativity, 
deep understanding and acceptance occurred when students not only recognised that objects 
did not have a fixed length and phenomena an inner duration, but also when they were 
guided to shift their sense of reality to something else. In that case that ‘something else’ 
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was the ‘event’ that became the new ontological entity to which reality could be ascribed. 
In QP that entity is the quantum state. To foster such a shift means to re-think about the 
discourse and the language since the success passes through very precise and “small” 
details. Like in the case of relativity, the “object” ontology is so strong that also apparently 
insignificant aspects can be crucial. 
Therefore, despite being great part of the debate upon teaching QP focused on interpretative 
issues, we mainly claim for the need to shift the ground on a cognitive plane, as to further 
move from an ‘object-ontology’ to a ‘state-ontology’. How do the other proposals address 
such an issue? This question is addressed in the next section. 
 
3.2.3.2 Main didactical choices on the ontological shift 
An analysis of the research literature explicitly carried out to answer the previous question 
led us to identify three main didactical approaches about the ‘ontological shift’: 
1. a clear-cut refusal of any reflection about the ontology, being a controversial point: 
2. a progressive cleaning-up process from the classical to quantum ontology, up to build 
up a new language to be applied to deal with quantum objects;  
3. a ‘reasoned’ jump to the quantum ontology through the introduction of a new 
interpretative scheme, for describing a wide range of phenomena. 
In what follows these three main educational choices are outlined and briefly analysed. 
 
1. Refusal of any ontology 
This particular stance on the ontological problem, the most ‘orthodox’ one, finds its 
supporters in those who generally agree with the Copenhagen interpretation of QP. A 
famous statement by D. Mermin captures the mood: “If I were forced to sum up in one 
sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be: shut up and 
calculate!”.  
This perspective is emphatically sponsored by Feynman himself, as expressed in the 
following statements: 
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“Physicists [...] understood that the essential point is not whether you like a theory or 
not, but if it provide forecasts in accordance with the experiments. The philosophical 
richness, ease, the reasonableness of a theory are all things that do not interest” 
(Feynman, 1985). 
 
“What I am going to tell you about is what we teach our physics students in the third 
or fourth year of graduate school and you think I’m going to explain it to you so that 
you can understand it? No, you’re not going to be able to understand it. Why then am 
I going to bother you with all this? Why are you going to sit here all this time, when 
you won’t be able to understand what I am going to say? It is my task to convince you 
not to turn away because you don’t understand it. You see, my physics students don’t 
understand it either. That is because I don’t understand it. Nobody does” (Feynman, 
1985) 
 
Basically, the teaching proposals which explicitly take this stance on the ontological shift 
are the ones which faithfully follow the Feynman’s model for explaining QP, based upon 
the Path’s integrals’ theory (Feynman, 1965). An example is the teaching proposal reported 
in Dobson (2000) for British schools, that completely entails Feynman’s reflections and 
builds up the phasor’s methodology explicitly avoiding any interpretative question:   
 
“The gamma photons arrive randomly. How do they get from A to B? 
We have no way of answering this question. This fact is strongly emphasized to 
students. All we can observe is what happens at A and what happens at B. We don’t 
try to talk about wave–particle duality—this confuses the issue. When students 
studied waves they saw ‘interference’ effects, which are fairly easily explained on a 
wave model—but how can photons get into this act? Or, how can a ‘wave’ pack itself 
into a space small enough to trigger a GM tube? We don’t know. We don’t really 
care” (Dobson, 2000) 
 
Here the refuse of any interpretation is subtle since it is implicitly promoting an ontological 
shift from the object to the experiments results: to happenings in A and B. The approach is 
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suggesting to avoid any attempt to model what happens between A and B and just trust 
formalism prediction power. This ontological shift can work for some students and Marco 
and Cheng explicitly adopted this view and they were successful in appropriating the 
physics contents. Marco, more than Cheng, however seems to complain that that ontology 
is “for him”.  
More in general, the approach that refuses any interpretative nuance not always succeed in 
promoting this ontological shift from object to experiments. Besides our own results, 
reported in (2.4), the findings of Baily & Finkelstein (2010) seem to show that generally 
students tend to remain still attached to that naïve realism that teachers wanted implicitly to 
avoid. 
 
2. Cleaning-up process from the classical ontology 
Another approach to the ‘ontological shift’ is the one that entails an accompanied process 
of refinement of the ontological descriptions of the object, so as to reach a language to be 
used for describing also other quantum entities. 
Along this line are the proposals of the research group of Pavia University (Malgieri, 
Onorato, De Ambrosis, 2014), which is based on Feynman’s approach, but it however deals 
with the interpretative issues, and the one of Udine University (Michelini, Santi, Stefanel, 
2010) grounded on the proposal of Ghirardi (Ghirardi, 1997) about polarisation of light. In 
what follows some important points of each are briefly presented. 
 
! Pavia’s proposal bets on the strong points of Feynman’s ‘Sum over paths’ approach, 
which are, in their opinion: 
-­‐ an algorithm that allows to face QP’s mathematical difficulties in a way feasible by 
secondary school’s students; 
-­‐ an adequate language for expressing the most arduous and deep concepts; 
-­‐ the visualisation of processes through a graphical representation of the mathematical 
model.	  
The authors recognize the cognitive limits of considering this a mere method and choose to 
follow further guidelines in order to “facilitate meta-conceptual awareness […] and 
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explicitly highlight [to students] those ontological categories that must be created anew” 
(Malgieri, 2015, par. 2.3). The idea is to accompany the ontological shift of quantum 
objects through a step-by-step refinement process; this is made, mostly, through the 
analysis of modern quantum optics experiments so as to outline step by step the photons’ 
quantum ontology (its properties and its features with respect to a classic object). The 
figure below is a conceptual map for the photon phenomenology, with the related 
misconceptions that can come out and that the following experiment aims to address: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 
 
 
In the conclusions of Malgieri’s PhD dissertation (Malgieri, 2015, chapter 7) an interesting 
remark concerns the visualisation of quantum processes through graphical simulations: 
“simulations giving to students the wrong impression, even with subtle hints, that quantum 
objects retained classical features, such as trajectories, could be a decisive factor in 
leading them to produce inconsistent conceptions”.  
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Figure 3.13 
 
In this direction the attempt was to follow a “source-to-detector’ philosophy, so as to “focus 
students' attention on the emission and detection events and the paths between them, rather 
than on the quantum object itself, which was never directly represented”. 
Therefore, what could seem a handhold for visualising quantum description, so to be 
considered a point of strength of Feynman’s approach, has been revealed in some cases to 
be leading to misconceptions about the object itself.  
Without any presumption of drawing clear-cut conclusions, this approach is well-known to 
be very at risk to resonate with a classical ontology because of its language and its very 
insistence on the object’s possible paths, which somehow keeps fixed the attention on the 
object itself, and not on system as a whole; the graphic representation seems to be only 
emphasizing this implicit focusing. The researchers of Pavia were very conscious of that 
and this is the main reason that pushed them to carry out explicitly a cleaning-up process 
from the classical ontology. As we will describe in the next chapters about uncertainty 
principle and superposition state, this progressively “destructive” logic can clash against 
other needs and a linguistic shift toward the “state ontology” is not so easy.  
 
! Ghirardi’s approach to QP choose to deal with the polarisation of light, as 
“polarisation phenomena, and in particular the way in which polarisation states can 
combine with each other, present tight analogies with the way in which quantum states do 
combine in general, and thus allow to show the key principles of the formalism in a simple 
and direct fashion” (Ghirardi, 1997).  
	  
	  
	  
80	  
Some experimental set-ups with polaroids and birefringent crystals are presented, 
equivalently to what done in Bologna’s proposal for SG configurations, building up a 
logical argumentation about the results obtained with multiple birefringent crystals in 
series, with one photon at time: the photon cannot logically be considered to cross neither 
only one of the path in the crystal, neither both, and indeed neither none. The superposition 
state has to be introduced to account for the outcomes (Ghirardi, 1997, chapter 4). 
 
 
Figure 3.14 
 
Even in this case the ontological shift is accompanied through a cleaning-up process guided 
by phenomenological evidences, concerning in this case the polarisation of the photon.  
 
Keeping an eye on the ontological shift, we underline a particular point in Ghirardi’s 
reasoning about the superposition state. As an introduction, he firstly highlights that “the 
quantum mechanics’ superposition principle is of an essentially different nature from the 
ones of any classical theory”.  
However, in order to explore this difference, the language seems to be often forced to 
handle a still classical vocabulary, and the comparisons, also, find often their counterpart in 
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classical examples. This is very evident in the following extract about the electro-magnetic 
fields in Mach-Zender interferometer (Ghirardi, 1997, p.83):  
	  
“Obviously, the fields propagating along the axes play the role of the ‘wave 
function’ of the photon, and their squares identify the probability for activating the 
detector on the x-axis or the one on the y-axis, respectively”.  
	  
Or equivalently:  
	  
“Reminding that the square of the [electro-magnetic] field rules the probability for 
particle to be detected along one path…”. 
	  
We are prone to say that such an use of similarities between polarisation and quantum 
superposition states, instead of characterizing the peculiarities of the latter, could even 
weaken their differences, making the two ontological planes to almost coincide.  
 
3. ‘Reasoned’ jump to the quantum ontology  
A	  third	  approach	  chosen	  for	  facing	  off	  the	  ontological	  shift	  is	  to	  ‘jump’	  directly	  to	  the	  
quantum	   formal	   and	   philosophical	   description	   of	   the	   phenomena,	   as	   to	   not	   get	  
trapped	  in	  semi-­‐classical	  views,	  and	  only	  after	  compare	  this	  picture	  with	  the	  classical	  
paradigms.	  
An	   example	   of	   this	   stance	   is	   the	   didactical	   proposal	   of	   Pospiech,	   yet	   introduced	   in	  
chapter	  1,	  who	  choose	  a	  logical-­‐philosophical	  approach	  for	  teaching	  quantum	  physics	  
(Pospiech,	   2010).	   In	   some	  of her works, the author points out that “most difficulties in 
understanding quantum theory arise from trying to develop quantum theory starting from 
classical concepts and then explaining the differences”, “but it is just these classical 
concepts borne from daily experiences that have to be thrown away” (Pospiech, 2000). 
In order to reach a appropriate understanding of quantum physics concepts, the proposal is 
to develop a formal framework starting from spin, which is indeed not classical and allows 
for getting inside simple formal tools as Pauli’s matrices, which have been demonstrated to 
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be well greeted by students. Next, some core concepts of quantum physics can be 
consequently introduced, as uncertainty principle and entanglement, which form a logical 
structure to be compared with classical paradigms. 
Such an approach could be read as a sort of accomplishment to the ontological shift, but 
quite opposite from the phenomenological one, as it starts giving a synthetic quantum 
picture (the jump) to be next compared with the classical ones from a formal, 
epistemological and philosophical point of view (‘reasoned’). 
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CHAPTER 4  
Proposals for improvements 
 
 
 
In this chapter we suggest three lines of improvement of Bologna’s teaching path, in the 
light of the results achieved on students’ non-acceptance reactions. 
As we showed, the most delicate points seems to concern the uncertainty relations and the 
superposition state; these parts of the path are here re-designed in order to address explicitly 
the exposed cognitive needs.  
In particular, in section (4.1.1) we suggest a deeply different approach to address the 
uncertainty principle, whilst in section (4.1.2) we zoom in on the specific step where the 
ontological shift appears, namely in the introduction of the pars construens. In section 
(4.1.3) we outline a possible conclusion of the path, where the formal framework, 
developed through Stern-Gerlach (SG) and Mach-Zender (MZ) apparatuses, is applied to 
the familiar phenomenology of the double slits experiment. 
A draft version of the improvements has been informally tested in different contexts and the 
reactions of the audience were strongly supportive. The first two improvements were 
implemented by Levrini in two contexts of in service teacher education (meetings organised 
by schools in Fano and Piacenza) and in the course of Physics Education at the Master 
Degree in Physics, University of Bologna. The third improvement was implemented by the 
author of this Dissertation in the experimentation led in Castel San Pietro. More structured 
and designed tests will be probably carried out in the next year by the research group in 
Physics Education. 
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4.1 REVIEW OF UNCERTAINTY’S INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty relations deserve a deeply revised introduction so as to resonate with the 
cognitive needs, and to avoid the persistence of classical views on the quantum description 
of phenomena. In particular, the analysis led us to realize that we had to revise the whole 
approach and the general logic.  
As underlined, in the previous implementations, we chose to follow an historical approach, 
that started from Heisenberg’s article and the gamma rays thought experiment, as to next 
pass through Bohr’s and Levy-Leblond’s critics. Such an approach followed a 
progressively destructive logic, which aimed to clean up an obsolete image of uncertainty. 
From the empirical findings we can affirm that the constructive pieces we offered step by 
step didn’t result in a comprehensive picture with a sufficient strength: It failed to stress the 
novelties of the new paradigm and to recompose the fragments we had sown along the path. 
We are now suggesting a presentation based on a completely new logic, starting from the 
analysis of uncertainty relations per se, so as to provide the essence of the physical content 
in a synthetic way. Only after that, we contrast such a core view with the previous classical 
models. In building the core view, the presentation will pave the way to the ontological 
shift, that will be more explicitly addressed as the first stage of the pars construens. 
This approach was also elevated to the role of a general methodology that we applied also 
to revise the other topics: (1) firstly individuating the ontological elements needed to 
accomplish the ontological shift (which is in this context the ‘spectrum of values’ or 
‘extended set of numbers’ for describing the observables, and that will become the state in 
the pars construens), and next (2) using this new ontology for giving a comprehensive 
picture (visualisation) to be compared with other familiar or even only different models or 
contexts (comparability). 
 
4.1.1 The core content: building a comprehensive picture 
We suggest to introduce the uncertainty relations in their formal expression and to discuss 
how this apparent simple formula contains deeply revolutionary contents: 
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∆𝒙Δ𝒑 ≥     
ℎ
4𝜋 =
ℏ
2 
 
where ℏ = !
!!
 = 1,054x10-34Js 
 
As first step, the physical content of the relation is investigated through the analysis of a 
single-slit diffraction experiment executed with single photons [Muiño, 2000; Matteucci, 
2010]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: a single-slit apparatus scheme 
 
Making a photon beam pass through the slit generates an interference pattern on the screen. 
It can be made clear to students that, thanks to the de Broglie’s relation, this phenomenon 
occurs for any particle or atom.  
The experiment is analysed by applying the knowledge that the students already have about 
light diffraction so as to stress that crucial step represented by the “single object 
configuration” and, hence, by the application of the De Broglie’s relation. After that, the 
phenomenon is analysed in terms of information, considering the width of the slit as a 
measurement of the photon’s position along y direction, and the spread of the diffraction 
pattern as indication of the uncertainty on the momentum component along y. Making 
smaller the slit means having a more precise information of position, but at the same time 
the diffraction pattern spreads more along y, which means having a less precise 
measurement of photon’s momentum along y. The uncertainty obtained on the momentum 
can be theoretical estimated by applying the knowledge of optics ,together with the De 
	  
	  
	  
86	  
Broglie realtion, and compared with very recent experimental results [Matteucci, 2010] that 
are consistent with: 
 
∆𝑝! =
ℏ
2 ∆𝑦 
 
This case is hence re-discussed to outline the core contents of the uncertainty relations, 
which can be synthetized in the following sentences (the “core picture”):  
- In quantum physics there exist pairs of variables (called also conjugated) linked by 
uncertainty relations. The more the knowledge of one variable is precise, the more the 
uncertainty of the other increases. One pair of conjugated variable are position and 
momentum but many other exist. 
- There is a crucial difference between performing the diffraction experiment with a light 
ray, a collimated beam or with single photons. This difference, in particular, between 
the beam and the single object is crucial also because it allows us to introduce the so-
called quantum non-epistemic probability, as the interpretation of deviation ∆ is of a 
statistical mould for the first case (thus in principle reducible), and of a different 
nature, namely ontological to the description of the quantum object itself, for the latter. 
The “uncertainty” that emerges from Heisenberg relations cannot be reduced by 
increasing or refining our knowledge: it is an intrinsic feature of the relation between 
conjugated variables.  
At this point the metaphor of the Chinese menu can be discussed with the students to stress 
the main core. The metaphor is puzzling since it is not well developed. Instead of being a 
limit, it is a typical case where students’ creativity can emerge and can be stimulated. 
 
4.1.2 Comparing the picture with the classical descriptions	  
In order to resonate with the comparability need, the apparently simply formula is hence 
contrasted against the classical view. Three main points can be stressed for their deeply 
revolutionary potential: 
	  
	  
	  
87	  
1. Uncertainty (that in Italian has the more appropriate name of “indeterminazione”) does 
NOT have an experimental nature, but it is inner at the existence of conjugated 
variables; 
2. In quantum physics modelling, the properties of the object are assumed to have a 
spectrum of values and “NOT a well-determined value that measurement has to 
discover;  
3. The concept of space-time trajectories and classical determinism falls down. 
In more detail, the second aspect is probably the most delicate one, being the first moment 
that the issues of ontological shift can emerge. Reading from Lévy-Leblond and Balibar can 
help to stress that, “while for classical entities the physical properties take an unique and 
determined numerical values, for quantons they are characterised by numerical spectra, 
extended sets of numerical values” [Lévy-Leblond, Balibar, 1990]. When pairs of 
conjugated observables are taken into account, correlations between their distribution 
amplitudes emerge. This happens between the spatial e the momentum distributions, but it 
will be observed also with the components of the spin along x and z directions in the SG 
apparatus. This is the key concept that will also allow the metaphor of Erwin’s socks to be 
grasped. 
Also the third point is very delicate and not easy to be really appropriated. It this direction it 
seems to effective the reading of an excerpt from the original memory of Heinsenberg: 
 
“But in the rigorous formulation of the law of causality - "If we know the present 
precisely, we can calculate the future" - it is not the conclusion that is faulty, but 
the premise . We simply cannot know the present in principle in all its parameters. 
Therefore all perception is a selection from a totality of possibilities and a 
limitation of what is possible in the future. Since the statistical nature of quantum 
theory is so closely to the certainty in all observations or perceptions, one could 
be tempted to conclude that behind the observed, statistical world a "real" world 
is hidden, in which the law of causality is applicable. We want to state explicitly 
that we believe such speculations to be both fruitless and pointless. The only task 
of physics is to describe the relation between observation. The true situation could 
rather be described better by the following: Because all experiments are subject 
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to the laws of quantum mechanics and hence to equation (I), it follows that 
quantum mechanics once and for all establishes the invalidity of the law of 
causality” (Heisenberg, 1927)  
 
If teachers wish to comment the gamma rays microscope, since this is how the textbook 
addresses uncertainty, the suggestion is to do it after this presentation as a sort of exercise 
aimed to recognise its “classical” nature. When this strategy was used in the context of 
teacher education made the teachers very happy since they experiences that exercise as a 
confirmation that they “got the point”. 
 
4.2 FOSTERING THE ONTOLOGICAL SHIFT 
As pointed out in Brookes & Etkina (2007), “physicists’ language encodes different 
varieties of analogical models through the use of grammar and conceptual metaphors” and 
it seems (it was the hypothesis pursued in the article) that “students categorize concepts 
into ontological categories based on the grammatical structure of physicists’ language”. 
What follows is a re-analysis of the language we used to introduce the interpretative 
apparatus. 
Our path foresees a fundamental step between the discussion of the uncertainty relations 
and the interpretative apparatus: Bohr’s complementarity and the overcoming of the wave-
particle duality through Lévy-Leblond’s metaphor of platypus. This is a part that we would 
maintain since it always reveals very effective to stress the need to search for a new 
ontology: 
 
“That the true nature of quantum objects has long been misunderstood is proved 
by their still all too common description in terms of an alleged “wave-particle 
duality”. It must be remarked first of all that this formulation is at best 
ambiguous. For it may be understood as meaning either that a quantum object is 
at once a wave and a particle, or that it is sometimes a wave and sometimes a 
particle. Neither one of these interpretations in fact make sense. “Wave” and 
“particle” are not things but concepts, and incompatible ones; as such, they 
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definitely cannot characterise the same entity. While it is true that quantum 
objects may in some cases look like waves, and in other cases like particles, it is 
truer still that in most situations, particularly the ones explored by the elaborate 
modern experiments, they resemble neither one nor the other. The situation here 
is reminiscent of that encountered by the first explorers of Australia, when they 
discovered strange animals dwelling in brooks. Viewed from the forefront, they 
exhibited a duckbill and webbed feet, while, seen from behind, they showed a 
furry body and tail. They were then dubbed “duckmoles”. It was later discovered 
that this “duck-mole duality” was of limited validity, and that the zoological 
specificity of these beasts deserved a proper naming, which was chosen as 
“platypus”. Bunge’s proposal to call them “quantons”, building on the common 
terminology (electrons, photons, nucleons, etc.) and extending it to a common 
categorisation, is most to the point, and it is to be hoped that this terminology 
gradually gains ground” (Lévy-Leblond, 2003) 
 
So the questions become: what are the properties of this new entity that we call quanton? 
Why does the quantum object deserve, like platypus, a new name? 
The answer to these questions should go, in our opinion, along the direction of recognising 
the “states” as the basic ontological entities that define the quantum object. In other words, 
the aim is to arrive to use consistently linguistic expressions that move from the idea that 
“objects are in a state” to the idea that “objects are the states”.  
On the basis of the previous remarks, we zoom in on the precise moment where in our path 
a new ontology is introduced. As described in (3.2.1), this happens during the presentation 
of the double slit apparatus used to build criteria to interpret the single object interference. 
The discussion is articulated in two main conceptual passages:  
1. The search for something that can explain the occurrence of the interference pattern; 
2. The analysis of Which Way configurations to better investigate the interference’s 
conditions.  
In that context the Dirac’s statement “Each photon [or electron] interferes with itself” is 
used to show the weirdness of the problem and, then, the words states, alternatives, 
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possibilities are introduced to provide a linguistic support for the fact that interference 
needs a superposition principle, but this superposition cannot occur between classical 
waves (that idea would clash against the experimental results at low intensity).  
This is exactly the point where the ontological shift was linguistically introduced in our 
teaching experience, but, we observed, it failed to satisfy the needs of reality and of 
visualization. 
What we are now suggesting is to make the shift more explicit, through a detailed and 
consistent linguistic analysis of the expressions used to describe the phenomenological 
situations. 
In particular, we suggest to present Dirac’s sentence as a linguistic trick that has two 
fundamental features: (1) it does real work to provide an apparently effective “picture” of 
the quantum object; (2) it cannot be read literally (literally it makes no sense) but is should 
be seen as a linguistic act that provides, through a synthetic idea, a cognitive prop.  
This second aspect is not trivial and was stressed by Dirac himself when he wrote:  
 
One may extend the meaning of the word ‘picture’ [mental model] to include any 
way of looking at the fundamental laws what makes their self-consistency obvious. 
(Dirac, 1947) 
 
In the words of Dirac, that linguistic act doesn’t provide a real picture but suggests a “way 
of looking at the fundamental laws” that can orient to keep the consistency of reasoning. 
Besides these pros, Dirac’s statement has serious cons: it can hinder any ontological shift 
since it outline a “picture” and a narrative strongly object-focused.  
More specifically, the statement pushes a reader to look at the interference apparatus by 
following the space-time story of the photon (or electron), like “there is a photon (an 
electron), it goes through the slits, interferes with itself and the interference pattern is 
produced”.  
 
The same type of analysis can be carried out on the other linguist act that we introduced: 
“what produces an interference patter is the superposition of possible states; ‘the 
interference of alternatives’ is the real characteristic of the quantum world” (Englert, 1999). 
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Fig. 4.1 – Double slit experiment 
 
Unlike the statement of Dirac, this one deserves a sort of explanation since it is suggesting 
a real gestalt change. According to this statement, a reader that looks at the figure 4.1 is 
invited to focus her/his attention to the whole configuration and to recognise the possible 
alternatives; interference is said to come from their superposition. In this case, the narrative 
is not a space-time story of an object travelling through an apparatus, but a systemic a-
temporal story built on the recognition of symmetries and indistinguishable paths (states).  
  
 
Fig. 4.2 – Double slit experiment (which way configuration) 
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In order to strengthen this gestalt change, figure 4.1 can be confronted with the Which Way 
configuration (Fig. 4.2), where information about the path can be gathered through a non-
disturbing measurement. Here interference disappears but nothing happened to the object. 
What changed was the whole configuration. The only possibility for getting information 
about which path destroys interference; actually, it destroys the superposition of the two 
alternatives. As a result, the ontology of the superposition state has to be searched in the 
physical presence of indistinguishable alternatives and not in ordinary wave properties of 
the object. At this point the sentence of Feynman should sound less tricky: “regardless of 
the quantum system, any information – recorded or not – about the alternative taken by a 
quantum process capable of following more than one alternative, destroys the interference 
between alternatives” (Feynman, 1965). 
In every context it was discussed, questions about the non-disturbing measurement were 
posed, like: “The whole argument seems reasonable but it is strongly dependent on that 
statement regarding the non-disturbing measurement. What does it mean?” (Matteo, 
Physics Education course, University of Bologna). In these cases, the Scully experiment 
(1991) already reported in fig. 3.6 has been discussed. Nevertheless an educational 
transposition of more recent experiments would be very useful. 
As final remark, the expression “interference of alternatives” is a trick like Dirac’s 
statement, a mere linguistic act that sounds strange if it is read literally. It is simply another 
cognitive prop that is supposed to help for checking the consistency of reasoning and, in 
this sense, to sustain a ‘visualization need’, just as Dirac’s picture did. Nevertheless, its 
potential, unlike the Dirac’s statement, lies in: (1) the narrative that it suggests, focused on 
a systemic view and a state-ontology, (2) its generalizability to every quantum system and 
configuration, including the SG ones, and (3) its closeness to the mathematical structure, 
that will be developed in the following stage of the proposal. 
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4.3  QUANTUM STATE AS A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE TO 
INTERPRET FAMILIAR PHENOMENA 
The issue of the ontological shift can also prevent, in our analysis, their attempt for building 
a comprehensive picture to interpret the experimental findings intentionally exposed to 
introduce the formalism (as it was for Stern-Gerlach experiments) and to compare it with 
more familiar phenomenologies (the double slit experiment, for example). We are indeed 
conjecturing that it is the lack of a proper ontology that ends up with considering the 
formalism as a mere mathematical tool for fitting the counts, but not adequate for 
visualising (getting it) the present phenomenon and for comparing it with other 
experimental situations, even belonging to the classical domain. 
These considerations led us to develop  a specific proposal that, as an attempt, follows the 
exposed requirements (and that could in future take the form of a group activity): a 
reflection on the maths-physics relationship based on the formal equivalence of TSI (two-
slits interferometer), SG (Stern-Gerlach), and MZ (Mach-Zender) experiments.  
The proposal is guessed to strengthen the ontological shift, since it is focused on an 
ontology of states and systems (and not of objects and its properties) and it is supposed to 
respond to the cognitive needs, by showing, once recognized the ontological unit (the state), 
how the mathematical structure built on the SG apparatus, is effective to interpret more 
familiar – and apparently “more realistic” – phenomenologies, like the double slits 
interference pattern. The operational and explicit strategy is to reframe the SG apparatus as 
an interferometer. This passage is the crucial one since it explicitly requires to overcome 
the idea that behind the interference there is a superposition of waves. In this sense, leading 
students to look at the SG apparatus as an interferometer implies guiding them to recognise 
that, also in this case, they have to focus their attention on the states and not on the objects. 
In what follows, some remarks for outlining a possible activity are presented. In particular, 
the formal equivalence between the quantum description of physically different systems (as 
it is for all the two-ways interferometers) is pointed out. This allows to re-interpret the SG 
apparatus as an interferometer, so as to enforce a cognitive ontology based upon the states. 
Next, some observations about the generality of superposition principle are proposed, so as 
to distance its domain from the only wave formalism, and re-collocate it in familiar 
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contexts, as the vector spaces in classical mechanics. Finally, a possible scheme for the 
activity is sketched out.  
 
4.3.1 Remarks on the formal equivalence between different physical 
systems 
The mathematical structure of the state vector |𝑆 , 
 
|𝑆 = 𝑐!|𝐴! + 𝑐!|𝐴!  
 
where |𝐴!  and |𝐴!  are the vector states for each alternative of the system and the 
coefficients 𝑐! and 𝑐! are the corresponding probability amplitudes, is indeed common to 
all two-state systems, or, to say, to all two-way interferometers, such as TSI (where the 
amplitudes correspond to two slits), SG (A1 and A2 corresponding to spin-up and spin-
down), MZ (A1 and A2 corresponding to path-1 and path-2) or others, like ‘bi-prism’ 
interferometers, or Ramsey-Bordé interferometers for two-level atoms [Berman, 1997] 
[Miffre et al., 2008]. For symmetrical systems, the state comes to be expressed, 
equivalently as: 
|𝑆 =
1
2
( 𝐴! + 𝐴! ) 
 
Therefore, being the mathematic structure completely equivalent, the only difference stands 
in the physical interpretation of the state and the amplitudes; despite describing a photon or 
an electron, and despite being the observables the polarisation degrees or the position, the 
formalism is exactly the same. This is the great abstractive power of quantum formalism, 
gathering which, in our opinion, students could reinforce their conceptions about the 
quantum description of a system as a whole (object + apparatus). 
More generally, as introduced to students after SG experiments, the most general 
expression for the state is described in the Bloch sphere, in dependence of two angles, as 
 
𝑆 𝜃,𝜙 =   𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 𝐴!   +   𝑒!"𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃|𝐴!  
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that for symmetric interferometers comes to be in dependence of the only interferometric 
phase difference 𝜙6, 
|𝑆 𝜙 =   
1
2
( 𝐴!   +   𝐴! 𝑒!") 
 
The phase difference 𝜙  assumes different physical meanings depending on the 
experimental set-up: for the TSI, 𝜙 is determined by the site where the electron hits the 
screen, for MZ by the difference of the optical path’s lengths, and for SG set-up by the 
spatial orientation of the second magnet (actually, a generic orientation in the space need 
also the angle 𝜃 to be described, that for TSI and MZ is determined by the position of 
electrons’ source beside the slits, and by the possible variable reflectivity of the beam 
splitter, respectively). 
For the state 𝑆, the interference pattern emerges clearly in the probability 𝑃 of finding the 
superposition state 𝑆(𝜙)7, 
 
𝑃 𝑆(𝜙) = 𝑆(𝜙) 𝑆 ! =
1
2 (1+ cos𝜙) 
 
where the interference fringes are clearly described by the dependence to cos  (𝜙). Thus, 
rereading the results of the basic SG and MZ set-ups (which were only of 100% or 0%), we 
can say that these are the maxima and the minima revealed both with a phase difference 
𝜙 = 0° and 𝜙 = 90°.  
Therefore, changing the phase difference (i.e. moving along the TSI’s screen, rotating the 
SG magnet and changing the paths’ lengths, or equivalently playing with a phase shifter, in 
MZ) means moving along the interference pattern.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  phase	   factor	   is	  multiplied	  only	   to	  one	  of	   the	  basis	  kets	  because	  of	   taking	  one	   the	   two	  complex	  
amplitudes	  as	  positive	  and	  real,	  which	  we	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
96	  
4.3.2 Distancing from wave imaginary: superposition in physics 
As previously pointed out, the crucial point of the proposal stands in recognising the Stern-
Gerlach apparatus as an interferometer because in students’ imaginary the superposition 
principle tends to refer to the domain of waves (so to an object ontology), and not to the 
states. Thus, the ontological shift is supposed to help students to satisfy the other cognitive 
needs (comparability and visualisation), as it would allow to compare the SG and the MZ 
apparatus with the double slit experiment through the concept of superposition of states, 
that is also the new comprehensive idea for visualisation. 
However, in order to detach the superposition principle from the classical wave picture 
another reflection can be proposed. As just underlined, one of the strongest points of 
quantum formalism is precisely its generality, as the same abstract structure can describe a 
great quantity of different physical phenomena. Not only: from such an abstract model a 
great number of physical previsions can be made, such as uncertainty principle, 
entanglement and statistical ensemble properties (Paty, 2003). This is particularly clear for 
quantum theory, but it’s quite a general feature of mathematical descriptions of physical 
reality, even for classical physics. 
In particular, superposition principle is the descriptive base for a great number of 
phenomena, as every time we have deal with a vector we do deal with superposition 
principle. Namely, despite being talking about an electric field, a velocity or a force, the 
mathematical formalism shows the same fundamental property of linearity, and the 
previsions too are based upon the identification of this mathematical structure. Took for 
granted the abstract ground, we can use its power entirely on moving forward to foresee 
other physical properties, which probably couldn’t be imagined in the previous 
experimental researches (some classical examples could be brought out in this perspective). 
Leading the attention towards some different phenomena, even the classical ones, described 
by the superposition principle, could become a powerful tool for understanding the nature 
of the quantum formalism on one hand, and for distancing it from the only waves’ domain 
on the other. 
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4.3.3 Sketch of a possible scheme 
Below, a possible scheme for a group activity is briefly outlined. 
1. After the interpretation of the SG and MZ results with the introduction of superposition 
state expression, an in-depth reflection on superposition principle and the concept of 
vector can be led in the activity, through the review of some known examples of 
physical quantities described by this very mathematical structure, as can be for the 
angular momentum, electro-magnetic fields or mechanical waves. As underlined, this 
could allow for previously distancing the concept of superposition from the waves 
domain. 
One critic point to be dealt here is the concept of abstract space, as to give an intuitive 
idea of what kind of vector space are the Hilbert’s ones. This could be made by writing 
down the general expression for a two-component vector (for example for the force, 
𝐹 = 𝐹 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑛! + 𝐹 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑛! ) and gradually substituting the axes with different 
variables, as x and y, 𝐸! and 𝐸!, or even with not ‘physical’ magnitudes, till pointing 
out that the properties of any system, or object, can be expressed as a point in an 
abstract space with the appropriate axes. This is also for the quantum state, defined as a 
vector in a particular complex space, the Hilbert space. 
2. After this brief review on the superposition principle, the effective formal equivalence 
between TSI, SG and MZ can be constructed. Some calculations with simple values of 
the angle 𝜃 and 𝜙 can be made, so as to show the change of probability in dependence 
of the latters. An interactive tool, as an applet, could be developed in order to move 
easily along the interference patterns by changing (or sliding) angle’s values. 
3. Further, an active discussion on the physical meaning of formalism and on its 
predictive role can be led, also with the help of historical and metaphorical texts.	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Conclusions 
 
The analysis reported in this dissertation aimed at interpreting a specific phenomenon we 
observed in classes of secondary schools exposed to Bologna’s teaching proposal on 
quantum physics: the phenomenon of non-acceptance of quantum physics, as we called it. 
Namely, we systematically observed cases of students who didn’t accept the theory as a 
personally reliable and convincing description of physical reality, even though seeming to 
understand the basic concepts of QP as they were proposed. 
Through a comparative analysis of students’ own words we were allowed for individuating 
some cognitive needs which students are not disposed to renounce for accepting QP. We 
them grouped in three categories: one, the need of visualisation, concerning the requirement 
for a comprehensive image of phenomena and demanding for a ‘clearer’ knowledge; 
another, the need of comparability, gathering the attempt for comparing the quantum world 
with the classical one, and asking for a ‘broader’ knowledge; and the need of reality, 
grounded on an ontological plane and searching for a ‘deeper’ knowledge. Also, we found 
that the strength of such needs depends on idiosyncratic aspects of each student. 
A review of the literature about students’ main difficulties in dealing with QP pointed out 
that behind the cognitive need of reality could be found the very problematic “conceptual 
shift needed in order to form a new ontology” (Mannila & Koponen, 2001). Our analysis 
showed that this ontological issue does not concern so much philosophical arguments about 
QP’s interpretations, but it’s rather a ‘cognitive ontology’. The ontological shift that 
learning QP seems to require for its acceptance, appears to have, by several students, the 
same nature as the one suggested by Levrini & diSessa (2008) for special relativity. There 
the needed ontological shift was between thinking in terms of ‘objects’ and thinking in 
terms of ‘events’. For QP the new ontology has to refer to the ‘state’, as the basic 
ontological entity on which the imaginary for interpreting phenomena should be grounded. 
In force of these and other findings about critical points of Bologna’s teaching proposal 
(namely the uncertainty principle and the superposition state), some suggestions were 
developed in order to improve the path and facilitate the acceptance of QP.  
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In particular, for the uncertainty principle, it has been proposed (1) to abandon the 
Heisenberg’s gamma rays microscope thought experiment, and (2) to not follow a 
destructive logic for polishing an obsolete view upon uncertainty, but to give from the 
beginning a synthetic image (as to gather the need of visualisation) of it with the analysis of 
the single slit apparatus, and only after possibly compare this image (need of comparability) 
with classical paradigms. 
As to accomplish the ontological shift, instead, a more detailed and precise work has been 
proposed for polishing the language and better focus on a ‘state’ ontology. Another 
proposal developed in this perspective is to reread the Stern-Gerlach apparatus as an 
interferometer, as to re-give, on one hand, to the superposition state its space, detached 
form wave formalism, and on the other hand, to compare it with more ‘familiar’ 
phenomena as the double slits experiment. 
We can conclude by pointing out some possible future directions: 
- To deepen the relations between the acceptance dynamics, learning and appropriation 
in the light of the proposed cognitive needs; 
- To apply the cognitive needs in further analyses to check their effectiveness in a 
broader and broader empirical basis and, vice versa, to refine their description through 
their test against new data; 
- To further explore the ontological shift as inner mechanism for accepting QP and for 
supporting deep processes of conceptual changes; 
- To develop new materials about ‘which way?’ apparatuses in a more detailed and 
formal way, as to reinforce the concept that measurements can be carried out without 
disturbing in a classical sense the system (almost always addressed by students as 
unconceivable).  
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